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INTRODUCTION
The first wave of religious freedom claims was asserted by individuals
complaining that governmental action interfered with their ability to act
pursuant to their religion’s dictates. The doctrinal and cultural response to
these claims has been well documented, and there is a contemporary
consensus in the United States favoring strong protections for individual
religious liberty.1 Controversially, these protections largely come now from
legislatures, not from courts’ enforcement of constitutional rights. Judicial
constitutional protections nearly disappeared following the Court’s widely
criticized opinion twenty years ago in Employment Division v. Smith,2 which
upheld a law that substantially burdened religious practice because the law
was neutral and generally applicable. But after Smith, Congress and more
than a dozen states enacted statutes that aimed to restore strong protections
for individuals.3 As a result of this legislative action, as well as (or, more
accurately, mostly due to) the widespread popular sentiment that gave rise to
it, individual religious liberty remains strong in the United States. 4
A second wave of religious freedom claims has been asserted with
increasing frequency, in both judicial courts and the court of public opinion,
on behalf of an array of religiously affiliated institutions. Unlike the first
wave, there is not presently a normative consensus as to what if any
protections these institutions – originally churches, schools, hospitals, and
social service organizations, but more recently corporations run by religious
individuals -- should receive. Evidence of this undecidedness can be found
in the federal government’s chaotic responses in three recent arenas. In a
decidedly unsympathetic decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a public law
See, e.g., NOAH F ELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD : AMERICA ’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM – AND WHAT W E
SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 235 (observing that Americans “all believe in religious liberty”).
2 494 U.S. 872 (1990). There is an extraordinarily deep opus of critiques. For a particularly powerful
example, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV .
1109 (1990).
3 Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which was overturned insofar as it
applied to states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and thereafter enacted the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). More than a dozen states have passed
legislation that mirrors the federal act that was declared to have beyond Congress’ powers in City of
Boerne. See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.
DAKOTA L. REV . 466 (2010).
4 See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and Secularization: The Shaking Foundations of
American Religious Liberty, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1755, 1756 (2011) (concluding that “religious liberty
remains relatively vibrant and robust in the United States.”). I do not mean to be pollyanish; there is
troubling evidence that Muslims’ success of religious liberty claims is substantially less than other
religious groups. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11:
Empirical Evidence From the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231 (2012). But this unfortunate pattern is
the exception proving the rule that, in the main, Americans are strongly supportive of religious liberty
claims advanced by individuals.
1
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school can refuse to register a Christian students’ organization that denied
membership to gay students who would not agree to comply with the
organization’s “Statement of Faith,” 5 which forbade homosexual relations.
Two years later the Court issued a strong institution-protecting decision,
finding a “ministerial exception” that exempts churches from antidiscrimination laws when making decisions to hire, retain, or discharge their
ministers. 6 Finally, last year the Obama administration tacked in the other
direction, issuing regulations under the Affordable Care Act that required
many religious employers -- including Catholic hospitals, universities, and
colleges -- to provide health insurance to their employees that includes
contraceptive devices and morning-after pills, the use of which is contrary to
the Catholic Church’s tenets. 7 Tens of lawsuits have been filed against this
so-called “contraception mandate.” 8 The Administration’s recent proposed
amendments to the regulations have been rejected by American bishops for
not going far enough. 9
The governmental decisions described above all have generated
considerable controversy, and there is not yet anything approaching a
popular consensus as to how such disputes should be resolved.
Scholars
have intervened, staking out two diametrically opposed positions. One
group has argued that churches are jurisdictionally independent of the state,
and therefore beyond government’s regulatory authority, vis-à-vis matters
within their domain.10 Scholars in this group have argued that churches have
are “sovereign within their own
“prerogatives of sovereignty,” 11
spheres,” 12are “entitled to legal autonomy,” 13 and are properly conceptualized
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
7 See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV . COLLOQUY 151 (2012).
8 See Ethan Bronner, A Flood of Suits Fights Coverage of Birth Control, THE NEW Y ORK TIMES A1 (January
27, 2013).
9 See Robert Pear, Bishops Reject Birth Control Compromise, THE N EW YORK TIMES (February 7, 2013).
10 See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79, 125 (2009) (concluding that “any exercise of statue authority that falls within the
proper scope of a coordinate sovereign sphere, like a religious entity, is beyond the state’s powers
unless one of a limited set of exceptions applies”); Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Civil Procedure and the
Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the
Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 43, 65 (2008) (“some matters lie within an exclusive sphere
of religion that is off limits to governmental regulation”); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a
Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. R EV. 1, 55-56 (1998) (arguing that “the status of
religious entities is acknowledged by the Establishment Clause, and a sphere is reserved in which
religious entities may operate unhindered by government in accordance with their own understanding
of divine origin and mission”).
11 Mark DeWolfe Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV . L. REV. 91, 92 (1953).
12Horwitz, supra note 10, at 83; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1385, 1387 (church and state are
“coexisting sovereigns” with distinct “spheres of interest”).
13 Id. at 119.
5
6
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as foreign embassies. 14 Several scholars in this group have begun extending
these jurisdictional conclusions to religious institutions beyond churches.15 I
shall call this the “Separate Spheres” approach.
The second group of scholars is well represented by an excellent
forthcoming article by Professors Richard Schragger and Micah
Schwartzman. 16 They sharply critique the Separate Spheres claim, concluding
instead that the state is the singular and supreme source of legal authority in
modern polities.17 Grounding their approach in Locke, they instead argue
that the church’s status is entirely derivative of the rights of its members, and
that “general principles of freedom of association, privacy, and conscience
are sufficient to protect all conscience-based associations, including
churches.” 18 Because this group of scholars essentially reduces churches to
their individual members, thereby eliminating religion as a distinct sphere, I
shall refer to theirs as the “Individualism” approach.
Drawing on John Rawls, this Article proposes a third framework for
determining the appropriate relationship between religious institutions (i.e.,
not only churches) and the state. Like Individualism, my approach rejects the
Separate Spheres view that religious institutions are jurisdictionally
independent of the modern state. In contrast to the Individualism, however,
I argue that religious institutions’ status in liberal societies is best justified not
on grounds of voluntary association, but individual self-actualization. This
provides a principled approach for determining what counts as a religious
institution, and what protections such institutions are entitled to. It further
shows why, pace Individualism, religious institutions cannot be reduced to the
individuals who compose them, but instead can be ‘greater than the sum of
the parts’ of their constituent members. 19 Concepts and legal doctrines
14
Steve D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911412.
15 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Freedom of the Church, Religious Nonprofits, and Progressivism: Comments on the
HHS Mandate, 21 J. L. & CONTEMP . LEGAL ISSUES xx (forthcoming 2013) (“non-church institutions
certainly have a sphere of exclusive authority over some internal decisions that affect their faith and
mission”) (internal citation omitted); Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Fit Within the Freedom of
the Church? (draft on file with author).
16 See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against The Religious Institution Principle, 98 VA. L. REV.
x
(forthcoming
2013)
(page
references
made
to
draft
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152060).
17 Id. at 22 (“identifying religious institutions as presiding over a uniquely sovereign sphere clashes
dramatically with our republican and democratic political commitments”).
18 Id.at 5.
19 I am grateful to Michael Paulsen for this metaphor. See also Esbeck, supra note 10, at 54 (suggesting
churches are “not the mere sum of the derivative rights of their individual members.”); Richard W.
Garnett, Religious Freedom, Church Autonomy, and Constitutionalism, 57 DRAKE L. R EV. 901, 907 (2009) (“an
understanding of religious faith, and religious freedom, that stops with the liberty of individual
conscience, and neglects institutions and communities, will be incomplete. And, so will the legal
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developed in relation to individuals and expressive associations accordingly
do not seamlessly transfer over to, and cannot adequately guard, religious
institutions.20 I refer to my approach as the “Religious Institution
Principle.”21
The Article unfolds in five parts. The first two parts elucidate and
critique the approaches developed to date. Part One addresses the Separate
Spheres account of church autonomy. The intellectual driver behind
Separate Spheres has been sectarian theological suppositions that cannot
reasonably be expected to be accepted by all citizens. Further, Separate
Spheres is unworkable because government’s legitimate interests necessarily
overlap with legitimate interests of religious institutions.
Part Two describes and critiques Individualism. Schragger and
Schwartzman’s article, the most detailed explication of Individualism to date,
ground their approach on John Locke’s Letter on Toleration. Part Two shows
Locke’s unsuitability for this task. Locke’s justification is premised on
theological assumptions not shared by many religions. Further, critical
analysis shows that Locke’s argument generates either virtually no
protections for religious institutions, or problematically insulates them from
all government supervision. Finally, Part Two argues that, Locke aside,
Individualism under-protects religious institutions.
Parts Three and Four develop and apply an alternative account, the
Religious Institution Principle, that I derive from John Rawls’ monumental
works on political theory.22 The Religious Institution Principle has three
fundamental implications. First, religious institutions appropriately have a
different status in society from most, possibly all, other associations. Second,
the principle provides a basis for determining what qualifies as a religious
institution. Third, religious institutions do not have any inherent autonomy:
some religions’ institutions fall outside the Religious Institution Principle’s
protections, and those coming under the principle still may be subject to
substantial government regulation.

arrangements and constitutional structures that such an understanding produces.”)
20 Cf Mark D. Rosen, The Structural Constitutional Principle of Republican Legitimacy, 54 WM . & MARY L.
REV. 371,421-22, 428-41 (2012) (explaining why individual rights doctrines cannot adequately protect
structural constitutional interests).
21 To be clear, the “the Religious Institutionalism” that is the object of Schragger and Schwartman’s
critique is what I call “Separate Spheres,” not my “Religious Institution Principle.”
22 I draw primarily on JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996), but also from JOHN RAWLS,
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS : A R ESTATEMENT, JOHN RAWLS , THE LAW OF P EOPLES (AND P UBLIC REASON
REVISITED ), and JOHN RAWLS , A THEORY OF JUSTICE.
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Parts III and IV flesh out these considerations, generating a robust
normative framework for evaluating religious institutions’ claims. In the
process, the Article illustrates the framework’s analytic utility by applying it to
many challenging issues past and present, including the polygamy decision in
Reynolds v. United States, 23 sexual abuse lawsuits against clergy, the ministerial
exception, the contraception mandate, the church autonomy cases, and many
difficult hypotheticals. The Article does not suggest that courts, legislatures,
or the executive branch necessarily should use the entire framework;
considerations of institutional competency and efficiency conceivably could
demand that a particular institution use simpler prophylactic rules. But
familiarity with the complete framework is crucial if responsible
simplifications are to be made, and for there to be meaningful assessments of
implemented simplifications.
Part V anticipates, and responds to, an array of difficult challenges
that might be leveled against the Religious Institution Principle.
It is important to explain at the outset why and how this Article uses
Rawls. I invoke Rawls because his work is deeply powerful: as the Article
explains, Rawls starts with minimal starting assumptions that can be affirmed
by virtually everyone, and then generates a framework that provides
substantial guidance to fairly structuring society’s political and social
institutions. For these reasons, Rawls unquestionably is among our most
important modern political theorists, and literally has shaped the way people
world-wide think about political theory.24 By invoking Rawls I deliberately
intend to engage with this international community, for this Article’s analysis
has application to all liberal polities, not just the United States.
But membership in the community of Rawls scholars does not entail
treating Rawls’ writings as an unchallengeable canon of truth. To the
contrary, his work serves as the starting point for critical analysis and, not
infrequently, refinement. Rawls thus becomes a focal point around which a
sustained scholarly conversation occurs, which holds out the promise of
generating deeper understandings than would emerge if each scholar aimed
to develop her own approach ex nihilo. 25
This ‘focal point’ perspective has informed some of my own Rawls
scholarship in the past, where I have critiqued and reworked aspects of
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
See, e.g., Religion and the Limits of Liberalism, P HILOSOPHIA VOL . 40, ISSUE 2 (June 2012) (symposium
with worldwide contributors focused on Rawls).
25This aspiration is grounded in the Condorcet jury theorem, which concludes that increasing numbers
of independent decisionmakers can improve decisional quality. For a critical discussion, see DAVID M.
ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC A UTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 222-36.
23
24
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Rawls’ work in the hope of better realizing his foundational objectives.26 It
informs this one as well, for this Article suggests two ways in which the
Rawlsian framework can be improved. Though virtually all the Article’s
conclusions are unaffected even if the reader rejects this Article’s two
proposed emendations, the Article explains why their adoption would
strengthen Rawls’ project. 27
I.

SEPARATE SPHERES
A.

Description and Intellectual Origin

Separate Spherists state that churches are “sovereign within their own
spheres” 28 and “entitled to legal autonomy.” 29 Churches “preexisted the state,
are transnational, and would continue to exist if the state were suddenly
dissolved or destroyed.”30 The state’s capabilities and domain are distinct
from the sacred domain that is the church’s, 31 and church and state
accordingly are “barred from intruding into one another’s realms.” 32 While
most Separate Spherists recognize that “there are some appropriate occasions
for state intervention,” these are said to be the “exception.” 33 Separate
Spherists have been encouraged by the Supreme Court’s recently decision in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 34 which
recognized a “ministerial exception” barring employment discrimination
claims against churches in relation to employment decisions concerning
church ministers, though a careful reading of the opinion discloses that the
Court did not adopt a Separate Spheres rationale. 35
See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, The Educational Autonomy of Perfectionist Religious Groups in a Liberal State, 1 J.
LAW, R ELIGION & STATE 1 (2012); Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance: A
Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1998).
27 See infra Parts IV.B.3(b) & V.C.
28Horwitz, supra note 10, at 83; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1385, 1387 (church and state are
“coexisting sovereigns” with distinct “spheres of interest”).
29 Id. at 119.
30 Esbeck, supra note 10, at 55; see also Smith, supra note 14, at xx.
31 See, e.g., Kalscheur, supra note 10, at 64; Pope Benedict XVI, God and Caesar (July 3, 2012) (last
viewed at http://www.thecatholicthing.org/notable/2012/god-and-caesar.html on 2/20/2013)
(“Fundamental to Christianity is the distinction between what belongs to Caesar and what belongs to
God, in other words, the distinction between Church and State, or, as the Second Vatican Council puts
it, the autonomy of the temporal sphere.”)
32 Horwitz, supra note 10, at 84.
33 Id. at 112.
34 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
35 The Court held that the ministerial exception functioned as an “affirmative defense” rather than a
“jurisdictional bar,” meaning that churches are not jurisdictionally independent of the state. See id. at
709 & n.4. Further, the Court “express[ed] no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits,
including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious
employers,” indicating once again that the Court was not treating churches as beyond government’s
26
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There is little doubt about what has been the intellectual engine that
has driven Separate Spheres. Separate Spheres has a conceptual connection
to, and has grown from, Christian theology. 36 Prominent in many accounts,
and not far from the surface in others, is the New Testament’s instruction
that people are to “[r]ender therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s;
and to God the things that are God’s.” 37,38 Another prominent, though
unlikely, influence on many Sovereign Spherists is the nineteenth century
Dutch theologian, journalist, and politician Abraham Kuyper. 39 As Kuyperinspired Separate Spherist Robert Cochran correctly observes while
explaining his view of church autonomy in contemporary America, Kuyper
believed that “God delegates authority to the state, but He also delegates
authority to other entities, each of which is sovereign in its sphere.” 40
Interestingly, Kuyper believed that what he called the “social spheres” – that
is to say, “the family, the business, science, art, and so forth” 41 – actually have
an ontological priority to the state: whereas the social spheres arose from
“the order of creation,” the state is a product of human sin. 42 No sphere’s
regulatory powers. Id. at 710. Other parts of the decision, however, invoked language suggestive of
Separate Spheres. See, e.g., id. at 709 (ministerial exception “ensures that the authority to select and
control who will minister to the faithful – a matter strictly ecclesiastical – is the church’s alone.”)
(internal citation and quotation omitted).
36 See Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV . 1869,
1887 (2009) (“the commitment to church-state separation . . . arose in--and acquired their sense and
their urgency from--a classical, Christian world view in which the spiritual and temporal were viewed as
separate domains within God's overarching order”).
37 L UKE 20:25. See, e.g., supra note 31; Steven D. Smith, American Religious Freedom: The Revised
Version 24-6 (describing Luke as implying “two different and independent authorities or jurisdictions,”
which gave rise to “Augustine with the imagery of the ‘two cities’” and “Luther and Calvin with the
imagery of the ‘two kingdoms’”, explaining that Luke 22:38’s reference to “two swords” “came to
signify the distinct and separate temporal and spiritual powers,” and concluding that “[t]he idea of two
separate and independent jurisdictions, temporal and spiritual, was a distinctively Christian notion”).
38 This is not to suggest that this verse only can be interpreted as recognizing (or creating) separate
temporal and sacred spheres, but that most of the advocates of Separate Spheres are Christians whose
approach has been shaped, and sometimes explicitly justified, by their theological commitments.
39Separate Spherists who draw on Kuyper include Paul Horwitz, supra note 10, at 83-84, 91-107, and
Robert Cochran, Jr., see Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvinist and
Catholic Insights 486, 487 in CHRISTIAN P ERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ,
ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR ., AND ANGELA C. CARMELLA , EDS., 2001). Kuyper has been drawn on by
many recent commentators who have sought to defend religious institutions. See, e.g., William E.
Thro & Charles J. Russo, Preserving Orthodoxy on Secular Campuses: The Right of Student Religious
Organizations to Exclude Non-Believers, 250 ED. LAW REP . 497, 507 & n. 63 (2010); Stanley W. CarlsonThies, Beyond Right of Conscience to Freedom to Live Faithfully, 24 REGENT U. L. REV . 351 (2011-2012).
40Cochran, supra note 39. Kuyper explained Calvinism’s “dominating principle” as being
“cosmologically, the Sovereignty of the Triune God over the whole Cosmos, in all its spheres and
kingdoms, visible and invisible. A primordial Sovereignty which eradiates in mankind in a threefold
deduced supremacy, viz., 1. The Sovereignty in the State; 2. The Sovereignty in Society; and 3. The
Sovereignty in the Church.” ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM (photo. Repreint 2007)
(1931), at 79, quoted in Horwitz, supra note 10, at 94.
41 Horwitz, supra note 10, at 95 & n. 118 (quoting KUYPER , L ECTURES ON CALVINISM, supra note 40, at
27).
42 Horwitz, supra note 10, at 96 & n. 129 (quoting Abraham Kuyper, Sphere Sovereignty, in ABRAHAM
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“God-given authority . . . . is subordinate to [any] other” sphere,43 though
Kuyper thought the state to be responsible for “compel[ling] mutual regard
for the boundary-lines of each” sphere and for “defend[ing] individuals and
the weak ones, in those spheres, against the abuse of power of the rest.” 44
Separate Sphere’s close connections to sectarian theology is
important for two reasons. First, Separate Spherists cannot plausibly expect
that their theological-based justifications will convince citizens who are not
their co-religionists.45 In the other direction, the fact that Separate Spheres is
part of, and arises from, its advocates’ understanding of the nature of reality
and ultimate truth is relevant to determining the range of political
arrangements that Separate Spherists plausibly can be expected to accept.46
Later I will explain how Rawls’ account, from which the Religious Institution
Principle is derived, has the conceptual resources for bridging these two
observations: The Religious Institution Principle provides a justification for
religious institutions that plausibly can be thought to be acceptable to both
religious Separate Spherists and to citizens who do not share their theological
presuppositions.
B.

From Separate to Overlapping Spheres

But what do modern Separate Spherists concretely want? Schragger
and Schwartzman suggest that Separate Spherists’ invocations of the
language of sovereignty are “[f]or the most part . . . . metaphorical,” 47 and
this may be largely correct, at least for now. After all, Separate Spheres
advocates have not taken the position that “churches are literal and co-equal
juridical entities with the power to exercise coercive authority.” 48 Nor have
they advocated for a restoration of the “benefit of the clergy, which
exempted clergy charged with criminal offenses from secular courts and
instead allowed them to be tried by far more lenient ecclesiastic courts,” 49 or
“for the return of a religious law that is of equal weight and runs parallel to
the civil law, enforced by religious courts under religious auspices.” 50 It is
possible, though, that Separate Spherists may push in these directions if their
present claims are successful.
KUYPER: A CENTENNIAL R EADER 1, 469 (James D. Bratt ed., 1998)).
43 COCHRAN, supra note 40, at 488.
44 KUYPER , L ECTURES ON CALVINISM , supra note 40, at 97, quoted in Horwitz, supra note 10, at 96-7.
45 For a point-by-point analysis and critique of several of the affirmative claims Separate Spherists have
propounded, see Schragger and Schwartzman, supra note 16 (recounting and critiquing arguments
based on pre-United States history and metaphysical “organic” claims).
46 Rawls is particularly attuned to questions such as this, and we shall return to it later.
47 Schragger and Schwartman, supra note 16, at 49.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 51.
50 Id.
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Professor Richard Garnett has offered what might be thought to be a
suitably modest version of Separate Spheres, the “core” (though not the
outer limits) of which he describes as “the freedom of the church to govern
and order itself and the limits on the secular power to interfere with that
governance” 51 and the “independence of the church from secular control.” 52
Garnett also speaks more broadly about religion having an “existence” that is
“outside, and meaningfully independent of” political authority.53
But is even this normatively defensible? The answer turns on what
precisely Garnett means by the church having the “freedom” to “govern and
order itself.” In conversation, Garnett has expressed an absolutist
understanding of this freedom,54 which is consistent both with the metaphor
of separate spheres and the approach advocated by some other Separate
Spherists. But such an approach is undesirable, and to see why just consider
the following six hypotheticals. Separate Spheres
1. insists that the state not interfere with a church whose rules of
internal governance provide that its adult high priests are to selfimmolate, or are to be sacrificed by other priests;
2.
precludes government from interfering with the corporal
or capital punishments a church meted out to its priests, and
perhaps its adult members too;55
3.
prevents government from stepping in to resolve
competing claims that were issued by different churches, for
instance Church A’s efforts to punish Priest Z with Church B’s
claim that Priest Z is a member in good standing of its church;
4.
condemns imprisoning a child molester if he belongs to a
religion whose church wants him to serve as a minister to a
congregation not confined to a penitentiary;
5.
maintains that government must allow the “church of the
avenger” to stock whatever weaponry they deem to be necessary to
its mission, regardless of the dangers this might pose to
neighboring non-church communities; and
6.
prevents government from imposing zoning and land use
restrictions on a church whose self-understood mission requires
skyscraping spires or loud public calls to prayer (like Islam’s adhan).

51 Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) an Exposition, Translation, and Defense, at 6-8
(draft on file with author).
52 Id. at 10 (emphasis supplied); see also id. at 32 (arguing on behalf of “the church’s independence
from state oversight and control over internal matters”).
53 Id. at 10 (emphasis supplied).
54 Garnett’s phrase need not be so understood, as is proven by freedom of speech’s coexistence with
substantial regulation of speech. Garnett’s statement that religion must be “meaningfully independent”
of the state is best understood as being consistent with some state regulation.
55 Cf. LAWRENCE WRIGHT , GOING CLEAR: SCIENTOLOGY , HOLLYWOOD , AND THE PRISON OF B ELIEF .

Rosen

Religious Institutions and the State: A Liberal Theory

10

We can generalize from these six examples. As hypotheticals 1-2
indicate, Separate Spheres insists that government categorically withdraw its
protective, paternalistic function from churches and priests, allowing
churches to do whatever they wish to their priests. As example 3 shows,
Separate Spheres overlooks the fact that there are multiple churches today,
each of which can simultaneously assert conflicting claims. As examples 4-6
illustrate, Separate Spheres requires that government categorically ignore the
spillover effects that churches have on non-members. 56
If we (or Garnett) agree that society could intervene in even one of
these circumstances, that would mean that the state could – sometimes, at
least – intervene in the governance and ordering of churches. This, in turn,
means that the metaphor of “separate spheres” (as well as sovereign spheres,
church autonomy, church sovereignty, and sphere sovereignty) misdescribes
the political architecture of church/state relations: instead of separate
spheres, there are overlapping spheres. And the spheres are overlapping
because it is not possible, either in fact or normatively, to draw non-porous
borders around churches that separate their actions from non-church
society’s legitimate interests.
To be sure, overlapping spheres is considerably messier than separate
spheres. Overlapping spheres – the conclusion that some things (like what
religious acts a priest can do) are matters of church governance and state
regulation -- opens the door to conflicts because each institution could have
a different view of what should be done. Separate Spheres eliminates this
possibility of inter-institutional conflict since, under it, only one institution
has power to govern. But the messiness of conflicts cannot responsibly be
solved through ipse dixit assertions of separate spheres if two institutions
properly exercise power. And the six examples provided above show that
church “governance and ordering” is not appropriately treated as a separate
jurisdictional sphere.
Not surprisingly, the Separate Spherists do not have the conceptual
resources to resolve inter-institutional conflicts; Separate Spheres, after all,
does not even recognize the possibility of conflicts. The Religious Institution
Principle does have the resources to deal with conflicts, as will be explained
later. 57

56
57

See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 28-29 (making similar argument).
See infra Part IV.B(3).
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Overlapping Spheres in Federalism and Separation of Powers

The conclusion that the relationship between church and state is
better described as one of overlapping rather than separate spheres should
not be surprising. To see why, let us return once again to Professor Garnett.
He plausibly suggests that the structural relationship between church and
state is analogous to two well-known political structures within the American
tradition, federalism and separation of powers. Like federalism and
separation of powers, Garnett says, the “differentiation of religious and
political authorities” is both a “structure of our Constitution and an
arrangement that contributes to its success.” 58 Other Separate Spherists
likewise have drawn parallels between their approach and these mainstay
American political structures. 59
But this analogy suggests a valuable lesson that cuts against an
absolutist understanding of church freedom: despite a seemingly natural
tendency to first conceptualize distinctive institutions (the sister states, the
federal government’s three branches) as having separate spheres, these
institutions have a structural relationship of overlapping powers.
1. Federalism
First consider horizontal federalism, in particular the relationship
among states’ regulatory authority. 60 The early approach, expressed by
Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, was precisely equivalent
to the Separate Spherists’ understanding of the relationship between church
and state. Justice Story averred that “the laws of every state affect and bind
directly all property . . . within its territory []. . . and all persons who are
resident within it,” and wrote that “no state . . . can, by its laws, directly
affect or bind property out of its own territory, or bind persons not resident
therein.” 61 Insofar as each state’s power extended to its physical borders, and
no further, Story had described a political architecture of separate
jurisdictional spheres. Early Supreme Court cases echoed Justice Story’s
approach. An 1881 decision declared that “[n]o State can legislate except
with reference to its own jurisdiction,” meaning within its own physical
Garnett, supra note 51, at 10-11.
See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note x, at 109 (stating that sphere sovereignty “is consistent with our larger
system of federalism, which divides various regulatory matters among a multitude of competing and
cooperating sovereigns.”). Others have made the connection as well. See, e.g., Kwame Anthony
Appiah, Global Citizenship, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2375, 2388-90 (2007) (discussing connection between
Kuyper’s sovereign spheres, federalism, and separation of powers).
60 The next three paragraphs draw from Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1145-47 (2010).
61JOSEPH STORY , COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18, 20 (2d ed. 1841).
58
59
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borders, and that “[e]ach State is independent of all the others in this
particular.” 62 An opinion eleven years later asserted that “[l]aws have no
force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts
them.” 63
This separate spheres approach to state regulatory powers, however,
never squared with actual practice. States early-on applied their laws to
persons, transactions, and occurrences that lay beyond their physical borders,
with the result that state regulatory authority was overlapping rather than
separate. For example, in 1819 the General Court of Virginia held that a
Virginia statute which criminalized “all felonies committed by citizen against
citizen, in any such place” supported the Virginia Attorney General’s
prosecution of a Virginia citizen for having stolen a fellow Virginian’s horse
in the District of Columbia, despite the fact that the Virginia citizen’s
conduct also violated the District’s law. 64 Consider also a nineteenth-century
Texas law that provided that “[p]ersons out of the State may commit, and be
liable to indictment and conviction for committing, any of the offenses
enumerated in this chapter, which do not in their commission necessarily
require a personal presence in this State.”65 Interpreting this law, an 1882
Texas decision upheld the application of Texas’s criminal law to an act of
forgery of a land certificate for Texas property even though all criminal acts
had occurred in Louisiana and hence were also covered by Louisiana law. 66
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court formally recognized the
power of states to regulate persons and things that lay beyond their physical
borders. In Strassheim v. Daily, the Court permitted Michigan to prosecute a
non-Michigander for acts defrauding Michigan that were undertaken in
Illinois.67 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes wrote that “[a]cts done
outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental
effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had
been present at the effect.”68 Today’s restatements and model codes
explicitly acknowledge that states have the power to apply their laws
extraterritorially,69 and the Supreme Court has observed that “a set of facts
62Bonaparte

v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881).
v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892); see also N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149,
161 (1914) (stating “it would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the
jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down the constitutional barriers by which all the States
are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority.”).
64 See Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 174 (1819).
651879 Tex. Crim. Stat. 454 (emphasis added).
66 Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 289, 305–09 (1882).
67 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 281 (1911).
68 Id. at 285.
69 SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF THE F OREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
reporters’ note 5 (1986) (states within the United States “may apply at least some laws to a person
63Huntington
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giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in
constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.” 70
In short, although the states originally were conceptualized as having separate
regulatory spheres, the Court now acknowledges that they have overlapping
regulatory authority.
The relationship between the federal and state governments, typically
referred to as “vertical federalism,” also is characterized as one of
overlapping rather than separate spheres. First consider regulatory power
from the federal perspective: as to most matters the federal government
regulates, the states also have constitutional power to regulate. For instance,
both the federal and state governments have the power to regulate, and have
regulated, such things as the environment, securities, automobile safety, the
relationship between employers and employees, and unions. 71 Indeed, the
federal government even regulates some subjects that traditionally are viewed
as falling exclusively within the domain of the states, like education 72 and the
family. 73
The significant regulatory overlap between the federal and state
governments is most easily seen by considering preemption doctrine.
Preemption questions arise whenever Congress enacts a statute that
addresses matters that the states previously have regulated. The conclusion
that state law has not been preempted means that both federal and state law
simultaneously govern -- a clear confirmation of overlapping regulatory
authority. 74 The contrary conclusion that state law has been preempted is
not an indication that the states lacked regulatory authority before Congress
legislated. It instead indicates that (1) the regulated matter fell within both
federal and state regulatory authority, (2) both the federal and state
governments regulated the matter, and (3) the federal government’s
regulation displaces the state’s, via the Supremacy Clause, because the state
law is in sufficient “tension” with federal law. 75 Since the acknowledgment
outside [State] territory on the basis that he is a citizen, resident, or domiciliary of the State.”); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f ) (1962) (State A may impose liability if “the offense is based on a statute of
this State that expressly prohibits conduct outside the State.”)
70 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981).
71 See generally Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW . U. L. R EV. 781, 783-92 (2008).
72 See, e.g., Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994); Improving
America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518; No Child Left Behind Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425).
73 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV . 1297 (1998) (showing
extensive federal regulation of family law throughout our country’s history).
74 See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 91 (2008) (holding that the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act and Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act governed cigarette
manufacturers’ advertising).
75 Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW . U. L. R EV. 727, 743 (2008).
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and resolution of conflict between governing authorities presupposes that
both had regulatory power, preemption doctrine confirms the existence of
extensive overlapping regulatory authority between the federal and state
governments.
Next, consider things from the states’ perspective: as to many
(though not all) matters that the Constitution empowers Congress to
regulate, states also have the power to regulate. For example, though the
Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States,” 76 the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that states also can sometimes regulate interstate
commerce. 77 Similarly, though the Constitution grants Congress the power
to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” 78 this constitutional grant
and “[t]he pervasiveness of federal regulation do[] not diminish the
importance of immigration policy to the States.” 79 Accordingly, states are
not without the constitutional authority to enact laws concerning
immigration, 80 though in fact there may be little room left for them to
regulate, under preemption doctrine, on account of the federal government’s
“extensive and complex” immigration laws. 81
In short, while there are some areas of exclusive federal regulatory
authority, the political architecture of state/federal regulatory authority is
overwhelmingly characterized by overlapping rather than separate spheres.
2. Separation of Powers
Madison adopted a separate spheres understanding in the famed
Pacificus-Helvidius exchange with Hamilton, where Madison argued that
President Washington could not interpret a mutual defense treaty that
potentially required America to join battle with France. Madison thought
only Congress could interpret the treaty on account of its power to declare
war, reasoning that “the same specific function or act, cannot possibly belong
to the two departments and be separately exerciseable by each. . . . A
concurrent authority in two independent departments to perform the same
U.S. CONST . art. I, § 8.
See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–20 (1851) (noting that the states have the
authority to regulate interstate commerce in some circumstances).
78 U.S. CONST . art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
79 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012).
80 See, e.g. id. at 2507-10 (upholding provision of Arizona law requiring state officers to make a
“reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” of any person they stop, detain, or arrest
on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is
unlawfully present in the United States”) (quoting Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (West 2012).
81Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.
76
77
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function with respect to the same thing, would be as awkward in practice, as
it is unnatural in theory.” 82
The extent to which Madison’s embrace of separate spheres was
shared by other Framers and by the early Court is an interesting question that
need not detain us here. (It certainly wasn’t shared by all: Hamilton
disagreed, and President Washington acted on Hamilton’s advice and
interpreted the treaty83). What is central for present purposes is the
contemporary consensus that the branches’ powers substantially overlap.
Justice Jackson’s Youngstown Steel concurrence is the accepted modern
understanding,84 and Jackson’s second category comprises the President’s
and Congress’ “concurrent authority,” 85 which refers to overlapping
presidential and congressional authority. For example, there is broad
agreement that the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers allowed him to
collect foreign intelligence, and that Congress likewise has the power to
regulate the collection of foreign intelligence under its powers to regulate the
land and naval forces. 86 Similarly, though the Constitution gives the
President the “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons,” 87 Congress can grant
amnesties that, according to the Supreme Court, are functionally equivalent
to pardons. 88 Probably most important of all, however, is the rule-making
undertaken by the executive branch’s administrative agencies. The vast
majority of contemporary federal law consists of agency generated
regulations that, as many Supreme Court Justices and most commentators
agree, are functionally equivalent to congressionally enacted statutes.89 The
JAMES MADISON , HELVIDIUS NUMBER II (1793), reprinted in ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES
MADISON, THE PACIFICUS-H ELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE
AMERICAN F OUNDING 68–69 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007).
83 For a discussion, see Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1073-76
(2010).
84See Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View That Jackson’s Concurrence Resolves the
Relation Between Congress and the Commander-in-Chief, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1703, 1711-16 (2007).
85 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring; see
Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown, supra note 84, at 1704-05 (explaining that Jackson’s second category
reflects the understanding that presidential and congressional powers can overlap).
86 See Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown, supra note 84, at 1711-12.
87U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
88Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) (recognizing this and noting that the difference between
pardons and amnesties is “one rather of philological interest than of legal importance” (quoting Knote
v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877)).
89See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court for “pretend[ing] . . . that the
authority delegated” to an administrative agency “is somehow not ‘legislative power,’” advocating
instead that “it would be both wiser and more faithful to what we have actually done in delegation
cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is ‘legislative power.’”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
985 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (explaining that “by virtue of congressional delegation, legislative
power can be exercised by independent agencies and Executive departments without the passage of
new legislation”); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
82
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Congress and executive branch hence have substantial overlapping authority
to make the rules that govern citizen behavior.
3. Judge and Jury
The pattern documented above regarding horizontal federalism -- an
initial expectation of separate spheres giving way to overlapping powers – is
found in lesser known contexts as well. For instance, whereas early Supreme
Court case law understood that only juries – and not judges – had the power
to find facts, judges today share significant fact-finding powers with juries. 90
To simplify a complicated story, the early twentieth-century decision
of Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. found unconstitutional a federal
judge’s judgment that disregarded a jury’s verdict for insufficient evidence
and directly entered judgment for the other party.91 The sole problem,
according to the Supreme Court, was that the federal court had “pass[ed] on
the issues of fact” by issuing a judgment for the other party.92 This was
problematic on account of the Supreme Court’s separate spheres
understanding of the relationship between judge and jury:
In the trial by jury, the right to which is secured by the Seventh
Amendment, both the court and the jury are essential factors. To the
former is committed a power of direction and superintendence, and to the
latter the ultimate determination of the issues of fact. Only through the
coöperation of the two, each acting within its appropriate sphere, can the
constitutional right be satisfied.93

The Slocum Court cited considerable precedent dating back to the early
nineteenth century that supported the view that juries alone had the power to
find facts.94
But separate spheres soon gave way to overlapping powers. In
Galloway v. United States, 95 the Supreme Court upheld the directed verdict
under the newly adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permitting judges
to enter judgment after trial, but before verdict, on the ground of insufficient
evidence.96 And in Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 97 the Court held that
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV . 2097, 2165, 2181 (2004) (concluding that administrative agencies
exercise federal legislative powers).
90 See Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, supra note 83, at 1080-87.
91 Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co, 228 U.S. 364, 387–88 (1913).
92 Id. at 387–88.
93 Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
94 See id. at 379-86.
95 319 U.S. 372.
96 See id. at 389–90; see also Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of Fact and Law, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 599-613 (2003) (showing that earlier decisions had upheld directed verdicts
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federal judges could not only disregard a jury’s verdict on grounds of
insufficient evidence, but also enter a verdict for the other party -- the
equivalent of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which had been held
to be beyond a judge’s powers only twenty years before in Slocum. 98
A careful look at Galloway demonstrates the extensive factfinding that
the federal judges had performed. Three dissenting Justices comprehensively
reviewed the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced at trial and
showed that the majority opinion, as well as the trial judge, had “weigh[ed]
conflicting evidence” and made credibility assessments. 99 The trial judge had
issued a directed verdict against a veteran who had sued for benefits due
under a war risk insurance policy. The veteran had the burden of proving
“total and permanent” disability no later than May 31, 1919. 100 The veteran’s
guardian introduced testimony from a doctor who had diagnosed the veteran
as suffering from a form of dementia that had been triggered by the shock of
conflict on the battle field before 1919. 101 The veteran also had offered the
testimony of two fellow soldiers, a friend who had known him both before
and after the war, and his commanding officer, all of whom testified to
behaviors that were consistent with the symptoms of insanity that the
testifying doctor had identified.102 In deciding against the veteran, the
majority “re-examine[d] testimony offered in a common law suit [and]
weigh[ed] conflicting evidence,” 103 thereby engaging in the type of factfinding
performed by juries. 104
Finally, and probably of greatest importance, federal courts deciding
motions for summary judgment today determine if there is a “genuine issue
as to any material fact” 105 by asking whether “a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” 106 Under these standards, federal judges
now “decide[] whether factual inferences from the evidence are reasonable,”

where one of the parties had offered no evidence at all or where the court was asked to apply
undisputed facts to the law).
97 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
98 See id. at 661.
99 See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 383–84 (majority opinion).
101 Id. at 408 (Black, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 408–12.
103 Id. at 397.
104 See Sward, supra note 96, at 603 (“The issue in Galloway could not be classified as anything other
than a question of fact: was Galloway permanently and totally disabled by reason of mental illness as of
May 31, 1919, or not?”).
105 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).
106 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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with the result that “[c]ases that would have been decided by a jury under the
common law are now dismissed by a judge under summary judgment.” 107
To be clear, the jury’s fact-finding powers have not been eliminated.
We now have a legal regime in which judges also have fact-finding powers,
and hence a system in which two institutions – judges and juries -- exercise
fact-finding powers.
4. The Lessons
What lessons are to be drawn from federalism, separation of powers,
and the relationship between judge and jury? All are contexts where power is
divided among multiple institutions as a structural mechanism for achieving
effective governance while checking against tyranny-threatening
concentrations of power. To the extent that there is a structural analogy
between these and church-state relations, as Garnett and other Separate
Spherists plausibly have suggested, 108 it is instructive to see that the
architecture of separate spheres has not fared well. Rather, initial
expectations of separate spheres have given way to overlapping powers.
Elsewhere I have fully explained the forces behind, and benefits of,
the shift from separate spheres to overlapping powers in the separation of
powers, federalism, and judge/jury contexts.109 These forces and benefits
consist of pragmatic considerations, 110 many of which transfer to the churchstate context. This Article does not explore these, but provides in Parts IIIV a normative justification for overlapping powers that is distinctive to the
realm of church-state relations.
The final lesson from federalism, separation of powers, and the
judge/jury relationship concerns conflict. Overlapping powers opens the
door to inter-institutional conflicts. The history of overlapping powers in
federalism, separation of powers, and between judge and jury shows that
such conflicts can be successfully managed. 111 Fear of conflict need not herd
us into an embrace of Separate Spheres.

Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 143 (2007).
Garnett, supra note 51, at 10-11.
109 See Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, supra note 83 at 1121-34.
110 See id. (noting that overlapping powers can lead to greater efficiencies, allows tasks to be
accomplished when one institution is paralyzed, can capture inter-institutional synergies, and may be
necessary to address emergencies).
111 See id. at 1135-40; Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown, supra note 84, at 1717-31.
107
108
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Republicanism

In an important but undertheorized part of their article, Schragger
and Schwartzman argue that Separate Spheres “clashes dramatically with our
republican and democratic political commitments.” 112 The argue as follows:
Republicanism demands that the people, acting through their legislatures,
constitute the sovereign. It is skeptical of the exercise of unaccountable
corporate power – whether by nobles, monopolies, labor unions, churches,
universities, or cities. In short, it does not tolerate corporate entities that
operate outside of and in defiance of the state. Group entities cannot
constitute a separate law unto themselves.113

I agree, but think it could be more fully justified argument. The Religious
Institution Principle does this.114
C.

Unavailing Arguments Against Separate Spheres

Schragger and Schwartzman propound three additional
interconnected criticisms against Separate Spheres. They argue that (1)
Separate Spherists have offered no principled way to determine what
religious institutions aside from churches are deserving of protection,115 (2)
religion is not unique, with the result that many other non-religious
institutions also would have to receive protections if churches are, 116 and (3)
proponents of separate spheres have not offered principled limits to church
freedom. 117 These three arguments together generate a giant slippery slope:
Separate Sphere’s lack of limits concerning what institutions receive
protections and the scope of these protections would lead to large numbers
of institutions that are independent of state control, which presumably would
be undesirable and unworkable.
In fact, some Separate Spherists have aimed to provide answers to
each of Schragger and Schwartzman’s three critiques, though none has
offered a systematic, internally consistent response.118 While I am uncertain
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 22.
Id. at 25-6.
114 See infra Part III.A.
115 See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 35 (noting that “a number of current-day religion
clause battles revolve around competing characterizations of groups – around the question of whether
a hospital, student group, a university, or an elementary school is a religious institution deserving of
protection for religion clause purposes”).
116 See id. at 31-37.
117 See id. at 27-30.
118 For instance, as to their first critique, Steve Smith has argued that only churches appropriately
receive protection. See x. As to the second, Rick Garnett has justified the special treatment accorded
to religious institutions vis-à-vis non-religious institutions on grounds of constitutional text and history.
112
113
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whether Separate Spheres has the conceptual resources to provide an
internally consistent and normatively attractive response to these three
critiques, the Religious Institution Principle does, as I will show below. 119
II.

INDIVIDUALISM
A.

Description

The Individualism position, ably articulated by Schragger and
Schwartzman, is that religious institutions do not have inherent autonomy,
but only those rights that derive from the conscience and associational rights
of their members. 120 “[C]hurch autonomy is a function of individual
autonomy,” claims Individualism, and “general principles of freedom of
association, privacy, and conscience are sufficient to protect all consciencebased associations, including churches.” 121 It follows that churches do not
have free exercise rights 122 independent of their members, but can assert free
exercise claims only if individual members of the church “have been
burdened in their free exercise of religion.” 123
As indicated above, I think Schragger and Schwartzman get it half
right: the status of religious institutions does indeed derive from individuals,
but religious institutions neither are reducible to their members nor are
adequately protected by the concepts and doctrines that apply to people.
This section critiques Individualism, while Parts III-IV construct my
affirmative account of the Religious Institution Principle.
B.

Critique
1. Inadequacies of the Lockean Justification

Schragger and Schwartzman ground Individualism on what they
conclude to be the “best justification” for church autonomy, Locke’s
position in the Letter on Toleration that churches are voluntary associations. 124
After first reviewing the Lockean argument on which they rely, this section
provides three reasons why it cannot ground a general account of religious
institutional autonomy in the modern era.
See Garnett, supra note 51, at 30. Less attention has been paid to their third criticism, though Paul
Horwitz has noted limit that Kuyper placed on churches and the other social spheres. See Horwitz,
supra note 10, at 111-13.
119 See infra Parts III & IV.
120 See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 5.
121 Id.
122 Or statutory rights under the RFRA or RLUIPA. See supra note 3.
123 Id. at 63.
124 Id. at 38.
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Schragger and Schwartzman quote a crucial paragraph in the Letter on
Toleration that provides a two-step argument for church autonomy. 125 The
first is an assumption concerning law’s necessity: every “society” -- by which
Locke means any group of persons united by some interest, such as
“philosophers for learning,” “merchants for commerce,” or a “church or
company” --“will presently dissolve and break in pieces unless it be regulated
by some law.” 126 The second step is church-specific: “since the joining
together of several members into this church-society . . . is absolutely free
and spontaneous, it necessarily follows that the right of making its laws can
belong to none but the society itself; or, at least (which is the same thing), to
those whom the society by common consent has authorized thereunto.” 127
According to Schragger and Schwartzman, the second step provides
the conceptual justification for church autonomy. As they explain it, the
“grounding of church autonomy in voluntary association” means that
churches have authority to rule not because they are “good, or benefit[] the
wider society, or help[] individuals actualize themselves, but rather because it is a
product of free association. In other words, the institutional church – understood
as a ‘voluntary society’ -- derives the right to choose, govern, and rule its own
members from the voluntary nature of the association, i.e., from consent.” 128
Throughout their article Schragger and Schwartzman shorthandedly refer to
Locke’s justification for church autonomy as being based on
“voluntarism,” 129 and I shall call Locke’s second step the “Voluntarism
Argument.”
There are three problems with relying on the Voluntarism Argument
as a justification for church autonomy. (As I soon explain, Schragger and
Schwartzman may have abbreviated Locke’s full argument for church
autonomy, which is relevant only to the third problem I identify).
a. Contingency
First, the Voluntarism Argument is factually contingent, and indeed is
inconsistent with the many religions and individuals who do not
conceptualize or experience the “joining together” of co-religionists into a
church as “absolutely free and spontaneous.” 130 Call this the “Empirical
Critique” of the Voluntarism Argument.
125

See id. at 41.
LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER W RITINGS 16 (Mark Goldie, Ed.).

126 JOHN
127 Id.

Schragger and Schwartman, supra note 16, at 41-42 (emphasis supplied).
See, e.g., id. at 40.
130 Schragger and Schwartzman themselves note this. See id. at 39. Though they think the challenge
128
129
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But is the Empirical Critique empirically valid – are there individuals
for whom, and religions for which, the Voluntarism Argument is
inapplicable? Most definitely yes.
For example, under Judaism’s selfunderstanding, all human beings are commanded by God to observe God’s
instructions.131 Furthermore, as to those who are born Jewish, there is no
opt-in: Jews are divinely “commanded” (in the words of the Bible 132) to obey
an extensive set of laws, which includes the duty to worship as part of a
religious community. 133 One of the paradigmatic marks of membership for
males in the Jewish community – circumcision – is commanded by religious
law to take place on the eighth day of life, which self-evidently is years before
a child can consent to joining a community. 134 Jewish Scriptures consistently
premises a Jew’s obligation to obey God’s law on God’s historical act of
redeeming the Israelites from Egypt.135 Moreover, there is no possibility of
exit from the religious community on the self-understanding of Judaism. 136
And, finally, the conformance to religious command that Locke describes as
being against conscience 137 is thought by Judaism to be a habituating first
step that can lead to ideal religious worship.138 All these crucial facets of
Judaism are inconsistent with the voluntarism assumption. While even one
counterfactual suffices, Judaism is not the sole exception; much the same can
be said of Islam. 139

“need[s] to be taken seriously,” they quickly conclude that “for our purposes their implications are
limited [because t]he acceptance of a non-voluntarist conception of religious institutions if virtually
unthinkable.” Id. at 40. Rawls helps us to see the problem with both Locke and Schwartzman and
Schragger’s defense of Locke: Locke’s account is premised on sectarian theological premises (i.e., only
one of many “reasonable comprehensive views” in Rawls’ terminology), and the relevant question is
whether a justification for church autonomy can be generated on the basis of a political (i.e., noncomprehensive) view that all reasonable persons can plausibly be expected to accept. See RAWLS ,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at xvi. This is precisely what Rawls aims to accomplish in
“Political Liberalism,” see id., and what the Religious Institution Principle hopes to accomplish as well.
131 See generally NAHUM RAKOVER , LAW AND THE NOAHIDES.
132 See, e.g., DEUTERONOMY 6:17 (“You surely shall keep the commandments . . . that your God has
commanded you”).
133 See LEVITICUS 16:29-34 (reciting obligations pertaining to Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement,
applicable to “all Jews” for “all time”); EXODUS 12:14-15 (same as to Passover); Deuteronomy 5:26
(speaking of an “eternal” obligation of the entire nation of Israel to “keep [God’s] commandments”).
134 See GENESIS 16:9-14.
135 See, e.g., D EUTERONOMY 6:12-25; id. 10:2-9.
136
See
generally
Michael
Gillette,
Jewish
Excommunication,
http://www.chavurahmasarti.org/Spinoza.htm.
137 See infra text and note 163.
138 This concept is expressed by the phrase in Jewish law that “mitoch she lo leshma, ba le’shma,” which
means “after initially performing the religious obligations without proper religious intent, the person
will come to perform them with the appropriate religious intent.” See BABYLONIAN TALMUD
PESACHIM 50b. It is used to explain why religious obligations must be performed even by a person
who does not understand herself to be religiously obligated, or who does not understand the obligation
to be a religious duty.
139 See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION 1 (noting that “while religion is integral to
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Locke’s voluntarism assumption is an artifact of his distinctive
theological commitments, more specifically his Protestantism. Voluntarism
flows from the centrality of faith and conscience to Locke’s religious
understandings.140 The commanded nature of membership and participation
found in other religious traditions reflects the fact that conscience and
consent function differently across religious:141 action can be religiously
meaningful in the absence of faith or intent under these non-Protestant
theologies, even as each deems religiously sincere action to be the highest form
of religious activity.142
To be sure, the Empirical Critique does not devastate Locke’s
argument, but only limits its applicability to religions that conceptualize
churches in the voluntaristic fashion Locke describes. But this limitation is
important for two reasons. First, it means that Locke’s account cannot
provide a general justification for church autonomy in a religiously
Locke’s voluntarism assumption applies to
heterogeneous society.143
Protestants, and perhaps some other Christians. But assuming that these are
not the only appropriate beneficiaries of church autonomy, the Lockean
account is incomplete. Second, because Locke’s account is premised on
contestable theological premises, it cannot reasonably be expected to be
acceptable to all reasonable citizens.144
b. Limited Institutions to Which it Applies
There is a second respect in which the Voluntarism Argument has
problematically limited scope: even as to those religions to which the
voluntarism assumption is applicable, its protections extend only to
institutions that have a “free and spontaneous” membership. Locke says that
the “church-society” so qualifies, but what else?
For instance, have
employees of a religious hospital freely and spontaneously joined that
institution? Ambulance drivers, and the patients they transport? Ambulatory
patients in circumstances where no comparable medical care is available
modern Western history, there are dangers in employing it as a normalizing concept when translating
Islamic traditions”); SABA MAHMOOD , POLITICS OF PIETY (providing detailed ethnographic study
showing how liberal division between religion and state fails to map onto Islam).
140 See infra note 160.
141 The statement above in text is true for today’s religionists. The fact that Judaism may believe that
earlier generations consented to God’s laws, and that this consent is binding on subsequent
generations, is fundamentally different from the individual consent Locke contemplates.
142 See supra note 138.
143 It should be noted that Locke understood that he was generating a justification that applied to a
“Christian Commonwealth,” and recognized that other religions’ theological commitments led them to
adopt a different relationship between religion and state. See id. at 42 (explaining why “the Commonwealth of the Jews, different in that from all others, was an absolute Theocracy”).
144 This is a Rawlsian criticism. See supra note 130.
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nearby? Insofar as “free and spontaneous” is, for Locke, a proxy for a
person consenting to give coercive authority to the institution, the answer to
most if not all these questions probably is “no.”
At this point in our discussion it is not yet possible to establish that
such limited scope is normatively problematic; that requires a normative
baseline that indicates what should be included, which must await Part III’s
account of the Religious Institution Principle. However, it is worth noting
that Schragger and Schwartzman do not limit protections to churches. For
instance, when analyzing the contraception mandate, Schragger and
Schwartzman do not say that Catholic hospitals are flatly beyond the scope
of protection for the simple reason that they are not churches.145 There
accordingly seems to be a disconnect between their approach and the
Lockean ground on which they rely.
c. Proves Either Nothing or Too Much
While the first and second critiques of Locke’s Voluntarism
Argument provided above address the scope of the Lockean claim for
church autonomy, the third critique presented now devastates the argument:
the Lockean justification for church autonomy either (1) proves nothing or
(2) proves too much by carrying unsettling implications that thereby
undermine the argument’s validity.
My claim that the Lockean justification simultaneously proves
nothing or too much may sound puzzling, so let me explain. I mentioned
above that Schragger and Schwartzman treat the Voluntarism Argument as if
it constituted the entirety of Locke’s argument for church autonomy, but that
it may not. 146 This section first shows that the Voluntarism Argument, on its
own, cannot provide an adequate justification for church autonomy (i.e., that
it proves nothing). But while my critique applies to Schragger and
Schwartzman’s treatment of Locke’s argument, it may not apply to Locke’s full
argument; Locke has the conceptual resources, beyond the paragraph in the
Letter on Toleration relied on by Schragger and Schwartzman, for answering
my critique of the Voluntarism Argument. But Locke’s full justification for
church autonomy runs into other profound difficulties: it proves too much
in the sense that it leads to problematic conclusions, thereby undermining the
full argument’s validity. As a result, neither Schragger and Schwartzman’s
abbreviation of Locke, nor Locke’s full justification, provides a satisfactory
account of church autonomy.
145
146

See id. at 62.
See supra text accompanying note 129.
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Proves Nothing

Locke states in the Letter on Toleration that because the joining
together of members into a “church-society” is “absolutely free and
spontaneous, it necessarily follows that the right of making its laws can belong to none
but the society itself.” 147 But how does it “necessarily follow[]” from the fact
that a church is composed of (or created by) members who freely and
spontaneously join together that “the right of making its laws can belong to
none but the society itself”? After all, why couldn’t individuals freely and
spontaneously decide to join an already existing church, some of whose laws
had been created in the past by the state? Or, why couldn’t individuals freely
and spontaneously decide to join an already existing church, with the
knowledge that some of the church’s laws might be amended, or later
created, by the state? In short, who authors a church’s laws is logically
independent of the voluntariness of joining that church. Call this the
“Voluntarism Critique.”
The Voluntarism Critique remains valid even if the members of a
church never consented to the state’s law, never delegated rule-making
authority to the state, and at all times reject the legitimacy of a state-made
law. For example, polygamy was a central part of the early Mormon
Church’s practice and theology, viewed as “a means to celestial glory.” 148
Congress banned polygamy in 1862, and the mainstream Mormon Church
officially abandoned polygamy in 1890. 149 During the 28 years between, did
the fact that the government in effect made some of the Mormon Church’s
laws by forbidding polygamy obviate the voluntariness of those individuals
who decided to join the Mormon Church during that time? 150 It is not at all
obvious why it should. If it did not – if, in other words, we are prepared to
say that individuals voluntarily joined the church at a time when the state but
not the church forbade polygamy -- then there is no necessary connection
between an individual’s “free and spontaneous” joining of a church and the
church’s “right of making its laws.” Pace Locke, the latter does not
“necessarily follow[]” from the former.
The following response might be offered: the state’s law forbidding
polygamy did not constitute the church’s law – the polygamy prohibition at all
times was simply the state’s law. Accordingly, the Mormon example is not a
LOCKE, supra note 126, at 16.
See THOMAS F. O’DEA, THE MORMONS 60 (1957).
149 See id. at 110-11.
150 As explained below, Locke’s answer to this challenge is to say that polygamy falls within the
exclusive domain of state regulatory authority, i.e., that it is not a matter of church law. See infra text
accompanying note 170. I critique that solution below. See id. at text and accompanying notes 166175. Accepting my critique leaves one facing the objection raised above in text.
147
148
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counter-example after all insofar as Locke’s conclusion – that “the right of
making its laws can belong to none but the society itself” – was not violated.
This response is logically sound; it reduces the Mormon example to a choiceof-law problem in which state law applies but does not displace or rewrite
church law. But this response renders Locke’s church autonomy claim
inconsequential: it places no limits on what the state can do, apart from
preventing the state from literally writing church law. Once again, we are left
with the conclusion that Locke’s argument effectively proves nothing vis-àvis church autonomy.
ii.

Proves too Much

While Schragger and Schwartzman reduce Locke’s church autonomy
argument to “voluntarism,” 151 and are vulnerable to the Voluntarism
Critique, Locke’s theory of church autonomy may comprise an additional
element that can answer the Voluntarism Critique. For Locke, government
only has the powers that it has been delegated by citizens’ consent, and
certain powers are non-delegable to the state. If Locke thought that religious
matters were non-delegable to the state, then his response to the Voluntarism
Critique would be as follows: (1) the state could not have made any of the
religion’s laws in my examples above because the state could not have been
delegated such powers and, therefore, (2) “the right of making its laws can
belong to none but the [church] itself” 152 pursuant to the powers delegated to
the church by its consenting members. These two propositions responding
to the Voluntarism Critique together constitute a non-trivial argument for
church autonomy.
In short, Locke’s argument for church autonomy is non-trivial only if
the Voluntarism Argument is paired with what might be called the “State
Non-Delegation Assumption” that the state cannot be delegated power to
enact laws concerning religion. I dub it the State Non-Delegation
Assumption because it doesn’t imply that religious matters are categorically
non-delegable – only that they cannot be delegated to the state (though,
according to Locke, they can be delegated to churches).
Does Locke incorporate the State Non-Delegation Assumption?
Almost certainly yes, as I shortly will show. But there is a rub: Locke’s
assumption rests on a theory of Separate Spheres, i.e., the notion that there is

See Schragger and Schwartman, supra note 16, at 40-41 (claiming that Locke’s Voluntarism
Argument “provides the association with liberty from political constraints on its internal governance,”
which “provides the basis for church autonomy.”).
152 LOCKE , supra note 126, at 16.
151
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a jurisdictional sphere that naturally belongs to religion and lies beyond the
state.
Three things emerge from this. First, we can immediately understand
why Schragger and Schwartzman disregard Locke’s State Non-Delegation
Assumption; their entire article, after all, is a frontal attack on Separate
Spheres. 153 Second, as the Voluntarism Critique establishes, Locke’s
argument for church autonomy becomes trivial without the State NonDelegation Assumption, rendering Schragger and Schwartzman’s
reconstitution of Locke inadequate to the task of grounding meaningful
church autonomy.
Third, though the State Non-Delegation Assumption answers the
Voluntarism Critique, the assumption fatally undermines Locke’s argument
for church autonomy. This is because Locke’s State Non-Delegation
Assumption establishes a jurisdictional realm beyond state control. This
renders his full church autonomy an example of Separate Spheres, which
accordingly must be rejected for the reasons explained above. 154 (Indeed,
analysis of Locke’s argument provides additional evidence of Separate
Spheres’ inadequacy as political architecture.) Stated formally: Locke’s full
argument ‘proves too much’ by establishing a Separate Spheres realm of
exclusive church jurisdiction, thereby undermining the full argument’s
validity under the principle of propositional logic known as modus tollens. 155
But is Locke really a Separate Spherist? Yes. In fact, carving out
separate spheres for government and church lies at the core of Locke’s
argument for toleration. Locke begins the Letter on Toleration by explaining
that he “esteem[s] it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the
Business of Civil Government from that of Religion, and to settle the just
Bounds that lie between the one and the other.” 156 As to the state, Locke
tells us that “the whole Jurisdiction of the Magistrate reaches only to these
civil Concernments; and that all Civil Power, Right, and Dominion is
bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things” – by
which Locke means “the just Possession of these things belonging to this
Life” -- “and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to
the Salvation of Souls.” 157 By contrast, “[t]he end of a Religious Society . . .
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 6-36.
See supra Part I.B-C.
155 Under modus tollens, if P implies Q, and Q is false, then P also is false. See generally VIRGINIA KLENK,
UNDERSTANDING SYMBOLIC LOGIC . For present purposes, P is Locke’s full argument for church
autonomy, and the (false) Q it implies is that “the right of making its laws can belong to none but the
[church] itself,” i.e., Separate Spheres. LOCKE, supra note 126, at 16.
156 LOCKE , supra note 126, at 12.
157 Id. at 12-13. Locke famously believed that civil government’s role was quite limited. See id. at 46.
153
154
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is the Publick Worship of God, and by means thereof the acquisition of
Eternal Life. All discipline ought therefore to tend to that End, and all
Ecclesiastical Laws to be thereunto confined. Nothing ought, nor can be
transacted in this Society, relating to the Possession of Civil and Worldly
Goods.” 158
Interestingly – and revealing once again the sectarian character of
Locke’s argument 159 -- Locke justifies the separateness of the religious and
civil spheres on the theological ground that meaningful religious acts must be
done according to one’s conscience, not compulsion. “All the life and Power
of true Religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind: And
Faith is not Faith without believing.” 160 From this it follows that “[i]n vain
therefore do Princes compel their Subjects to come into their Churchcommunion, under pretense of saving their Souls. If they believe, they will
come of their own accord; if they believe not, their coming will nothing avail
them.” 161 Indeed, Locke goes so far as to say that religious acts undertaken
pursuant to state compulsion “far from being any furtherance, are indeed
great Obstacles to our Salvation,” 162 and that for a state to command its
citizens to religious worship “in effect [is] to command them to offend
God.” 163 Continues Locke, “[a]s the magistrate has no power to impose by his
Limited state jurisdiction may have made separate jurisdictional spheres more possible than what is
possible in today’s world of more extensive governmental regulation. This would constitute a reason
for questioning the degree to which Locke’s approach can be applied today. The discussion above in
text shows, however, that Locke’s Separate Spheres approach was problematic even under his
assumption of limited civil jurisdiction.
158 Id. at 18.
159 Consistent with the observation above that conscience and voluntarism play different roles in
Protestantism than in Judaism and Islam, the idea that religion cannot by its nature be the subject of
the state’s law is a sectarian --most certainly not a universal – perspective. Judaism and Islam have no
analogue of Luke’s distinction between God and Caesar, and their Scriptures permit, and histories
include, state exercise of religious authority. See, e.g., ASAD , supra note 139, at 205-36 (contrasting
“the forcible redefinition of religion as belief, and of religious belief, sentiment, and identify as personal
matters that belong to the newly emerging space of private (as opposed to public) life” in Christian
Europe with the Islamic concept of umma, “a religious-political space . . . within which rational
discussion, debate, and criticism can be conducted. It is also a space of power and of punishment”).
160 Id. at 13; see also id. at 14 (“The care of the Salvation of Mens Souls cannot belong to the
Magistrate; because, though the rigour of Laws and the force of Penalties were capable to convince and
change Mens minds, yet would not that help at all to the Salvation of their Souls”); see also id. (“For
laws are of no force at all without Penalties, and Penalties in this case are absolutely impertinent;
because they are not proper to convince the mind.”); id. at 31 (“No way whatsoever that I shall walk in,
against the Dictates of my Conscience, will every bring me to the Mansions of the Blessed. I may grow
rich by an Art that I take not delight in; I may be cured of some Disease by Remedies that I have not
Faith in; but I cannot be saved by a Religion that I distrust, and by a Worship that I abhor. It is in vain
for an Unbeliever to take up the outward shew of another Mans Profession. Faith only, and inward
Sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God.”).
161 Id. at 32.
162 Id. at 13.
163 Id. at 33.
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laws the use of any rites and ceremonies in any church, so neither has he any
power to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are already received,
approved, and practiced by any church; because, if he did so, he would
destroy the church itself . . .” 164
In short, it is the jurisdictional distinctiveness between civil and
religious matters that is the foundation of Locke’s argument for “toleration,”
by which Locke means that the state should not regulate matters that fall
within the realm of religion.165 “[T]herefore,” concludes Locke, “when all is
done, [men] must be left to their own Consciences” regarding religion’s
domain. 166 In light of the theological presuppositions that give rise to
Locke’s Separate Spheres theory, it is likely that he embraced the State NonDelegation Assumption, according to which religious matters simply could
not be delegated to the state insofar as they fall outside of government’s
competency.
Predictably, the problems that attend Separate Spheres explained in
the previous section 167 are on full display in Locke. Separate Spheres requires
that activities be placed in one, but only one, sphere.168 Locke concludes that
matters concerning the “Publick good” fall within the state’s realm. 169
Though he unsurprisingly concludes that polygamy and divorce implicate the
public good, and accordingly can be regulated by the state, it surely would be
surprising to many religions (say Mormonism and Catholicism) to be told
that polygamy and divorce are not religious matters. Yet this is what Locke
concludes.170 Surely it is more plausible to say that polygamy and divorce
Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 26. As indicated above, Locke also discusses the toleration that should be exercised by private
individuals, see id. at 20, and churches, see id. at 19-20.
166 Id. at 32.
167 See supra Part I.B-I.C.
168 At one point deep into the Letter Locke appears to acknowledge jurisdictional overlap when he
concedes that “[m]oral actions” concerns both “Religion [and] also the Commonwealth.” Id. at 45.
But he quickly reverts to his Separate Spheres framework, averring that “if what has been already said
concerning the Limits of both these Governments be rights considered, it will easily remove all
difficulty in this matter” so that neither of the two “Jurisdictions intrench upon the other . . .” Id.
Continues Locke, “[f]or the Political Society is instituted for no other end but only to secure every
mans Possession of the things of this life. The care of each mans Soul, and of the things of Heaven,
which neither does belong to the Commonwealth, nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to every
mans self.” Id. at 48. Locke’s confident assertion here in no way solves the problem that he himself
recognizes.
169 Id. at 34.
170 Locke concludes that the state has jurisdiction over “indifferent things.” See id. at 33. Locke
differentiates between, on the one hand, “[t]hings in their own nature indifferent,” which he says
“cannot, by any human Authority, be made any part of the Worship of God . . . because they are
indifferent,” and, on the other hand, “[t]hings never so indifferent in their own nature,” which, “when
they are brought into the Church and Worship of God, are removed out of the reach of the
Magistrate’s Jurisdiction.” See id. at 33-34. As a consequence of Locke’s understanding of indifferent
164
165
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implicate both the state’s and religion’s interests. But Locke’s Separate
Spheres framework does not allow for such a conclusion.
Further evidence of Separate Spheres’ weakness is that, when
confronting concrete hard cases, Locke abandons the Separate Spheres that
grounded his argument for toleration. For instance, though a church’s rituals
might include child sacrifice, Locke concludes that the state can ban the
practice.171 But because Separate Spheres provided the conceptual grounds
for Locke’s argument for toleration, he has no resources for explaining why
the overlapping jurisdiction, and conflict, between state and church should
be resolved as he claims. Locke instead falls back on a conclusory assertion
that “those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people in their
ordinary use, and are therefore forbidden by laws, those things ought not to
be permitted to churches in their sacred rites.” 172
This merits two critical observations. First, given Locke’s conception
of the church, why wouldn’t the state ban have the effect of “destroy[ing] the
church itself”?173 Locke doesn’t tell us.174 Second, if Locke really means to
abandon Separate Spheres, and instead to embrace the proposition that the
state can proscribe church rituals that the state deems to be “prejudicial to
the commonweal of a people in their ordinary use,” 175 then we are left once
again with the previous subsection’s conclusion that Lockean church
autonomy doesn’t amount to much at all. And, indeed, at this point in the
Letter the best Locke can do is to caution that the magistrate be “very careful
that he does not misuse his authority to the oppression of any church, under
pretense of public good.” 176
To quickly summarize, Locke’s argument for church autonomy fails
for one of two reasons: it is either trivial because it proves too little, or it
proves too much by establishing a church realm that is utterly beyond state
things, all matters, at any given point in time, fall into either the magistrate’s or religion’s sphere. Locke
concludes that polygamy and divorce are indifferent things, see JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING
TOLERATION II, at 110, thereby placing them outside the church’s realm and into the exclusive sphere
of the magistrate.
171 Id. at 37. Locke also states that “if some congregations should have a mind to . . . lustfully pollute
themselves in promiscuous uncleanness, or practice any other such heinous enormities,” the state can
ban these things because “[t]hese things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life, nor in any private
house; and therefore neither are they so in the worship of God, or in any religious meeting.” Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 37.
174 Similarly, Locke acknowledges that slaughter of an animal can be a religious ritual, but nonetheless
concludes that the state can ban slaughter “for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of
cattle that had been destroyed by some extraordinary” disease. Id.
175 Id. at 37.
176 Id.
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regulatory authority. Either way, Locke cannot provide an adequate
grounding for church autonomy. An alternative framework is required.
2. Under-Protects
A second problem with Individualism is that it under-protects
religious institutions. Because identifying what constitutes under-protection
requires a normative baseline that indicates the proper level of protection, I
shall delay explanation of this shortcoming until after developing my
affirmative account of religious institution autonomy. 177
III.

THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION PRINCIPLE

This Part III derives what I call the “Religious Institution Principle
Principle” from Rawls’ political theory and fleshes out its contents. Part IV
identifies limitations on the Religious Institution Principle that flow from
other parts of Rawls’ theory. Part V anticipates, and responds to, several
difficult challenges that might be posed to the Religious Institution Principle.
A.

The Original Position

John Rawls’s project in Political Liberalism is to describe the basic
structure of a stable and enduring democratic constitutional regime that can
win the wholehearted support of a citizenry having a plurality of
incompatible, yet reasonable, comprehensive religious, philosophical and
moral doctrines. 178 Rawls famously elucidates the basic structure of political
society using the heuristic device of the “original position.” Under the
original position, people are to identify the fair political structure by
conceiving themselves as being under a “veil of ignorance” under which they
“do not know the social position, or the conception of the good (its
particular aims and attachments), or the realized abilities and psychological
propensities, and much else, of the persons they represent.” 179 Because
the parties do not know whether the beliefs espoused by the
persons they represent is a majority or a minority view ... [t]hey
cannot take chances by permitting a lesser liberty of conscience to
minority religions, say, on the possibility that those they represent
espouse a majority or dominant religion and will therefore have an
even greater liberty. For it may also happen that these persons
belong to a minority faith and may suffer accordingly. If the parties
were to gamble in this way, they would show that they did not take
the religious, philosophical or moral convictions of persons
seriously, and, in effect, did not know what a religious,
See infra Part III.E.2(b).
RAWLS, P OLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at xvi. The next three paragraphs draw from Rosen,
Outer Limits, supra note 26, at 1090-91.
179 Id. at 305.
177
178

Rosen

Religious Institutions and the State: A Liberal Theory

32

philosophical, or moral conviction was. 180

The veil of ignorance is a heuristic for enabling people to transcend
their self-interests so as to identify a fair (and hence just) political structure.
The veil of ignorance aims to transform personal self-interest into societywide interest: People in the original position choose a political structure that
maximally accommodates everybody’s religious, philosophical and moral
convictions because they do not know whom they actually represent, and
accordingly do not want to risk creating a polity that did not accommodate
whomever it is they happened to represent.
It follows that people in the original position would not select a
political structure that might preclude themselves from living in accordance
with their religious, philosophical or moral convictions. In Rawls’s words,
allowing autonomy for only select persons’ conceptions of the good would
constitute a “gamble [that would] show that [the person in the original
position] did not take the religious, philosophical or moral convictions of
persons seriously and, in effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical,
or moral conviction was.” 181
More specifically, Rawls concludes that people in the original position
would agree upon two principles of justice that determine society’s political
institutions. Only the first is relevant for present purposes. It provides that
“[e]ach person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.” 182
“The basic liberties (freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, and so
on). . . are the background institutional conditions necessary for the
development and the full informed exercise of the two moral powers,” 183 one
of which is the capacity to formulate a conception of the good.184
Rawls’ first principle of justice is stated at a high level of abstraction.
What concretely does it call for? To begin, Rawls understands that there are
multiple institutional arrangements that are consistent with the principles of
justice for two reasons. First, there are differences across societies – in terms
of population, history, and geography – such that an institutional
arrangement that satisfies the principles of justice in one society might not in
another. Second, even within a single society, there may be multiple
institutional arrangements that would be consistent with the principles of

180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.

at 311 (emphasis supplied).

at 291.
Id. at 308.
184 Id. at 19.
183
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justice. For these two reasons, Rawls’ theory does not demand a single set
of institutional arrangements.
But Rawls’ theory would have only limited utility if its guidance
ended there. Importantly, Rawls describes a four stage process by which
people can draw on the principles of justice to generate substantially detailed
institutional arrangements for their society. “Each stage is to represent an
appropriate point of view from which certain kinds of questions are
The first stage is the above described veil of ignorance,
considered.” 185
which generates the two principles of justice. In each subsequent stage the
veil is “partially lifted” until, at stage four “everyone has complete access to
all facts.” 186 In the second stage, which Rawls calls the “constitutional
convention,” parties “now know the relevant general facts about their
society, that is, its natural circumstances and resources, its level of economic
advance and political culture, and so on.”187 At the second stage, people thus
know the size of their society’s population as well as the degree of its
heterogeneity, including “a knowledge of the beliefs and interests that men in
the system are liable to have and of the political tactics that they will find it
rational to use given their circumstances.” 188 Though this is a significant
amount of culture-specific and time-specific information, Rawls plausibly
insists that “[p]rovided they have no information about particular individuals
including themselves, the idea of the original position” – by which he means
its ability to serve as a heuristic in the design of society’s institutions -- “is not
affected.” 189 Rawls calls the third the “legislative stage,” 190 and the fourth the
“administrative stage.”
When I use the original position to infer specific institutional
arrangements, I sometimes will be operating at the first stage, frequently at
the second, and occasionally the third. Differentiating between the stages is
not important for the purely internal purpose of determining what
contemporary American institutions should be like insofar as “the idea of the
original position is not affected” so long as the persons in the original
position do not know the specific people they represent.191 Differentiating
between the first and subsequent stages is important, however, to distinguish

RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 196.
Id. at 197, 199; see also RAWLS , JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 22, at 48 (“Limitations on
knowledge available to the parties are progressively relaxed in the next three stages”).
187 RAWLS, T HEORY OF J USTICE , supra note 22, at 197.
188 Id. at 198.
189 Id.
190 RAWLS, J USTICE AS F AIRNESS, supra note 22, at 48.
191 Id.
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between conclusions that apply to all liberal polities and those that are
specific to the United States.192
B.

Preliminary Statement of the Religious Institution Principle

The first principle of justice has important implications for religious
institutions. For many people, the freedom to develop and fully exercise a
conception of the good requires that they be able to live in accordance with
their religious convictions, which in turn presupposes the existence of certain
religious institutions. The political structure chosen under the original
position accordingly would be one that afforded such religious institutions
special protections.
this:

How extensive would those protections be? My basic conclusion is
A person in the original position, not knowing whether she
represents a non-religious person, a religious person who belongs
to a majority religion, or a religious person who belongs to a
minority religion, would not consent to a political structure that
had the power to prevent her religion’s religious institutions from
doing what is necessary, from the internal perspective of the
religious community, for its adherents to develop and fully exercise
the religion’s conception of the good.

I call this the “Religious Institution Principle.” After clarifying the Religious
Institution Principle in the rest of this subpart, the Article works out the
principle’s important implications in today’s United States.
1.

“what is necessary”

The Religious Institution Principle’s presumptive protections extend
to “what is necessary” for a religion’s adherents. Two objections may be
posed. First, it might be objected that this turns the Religious Institution
Principle into a null set for any religion that believes it has benefitted from
adversity, including confrontational relations with secular authorities.193 For
example, the biblical figure Joseph explained his kidnapping and
imprisonment as divinely guided events that ultimately led him to becoming
the second in command in Egypt, allowing him to save the Jewish and
Egyptian people from famine. 194 The Jewish community has similarly
understood painful historical periods (such as exile from the land of Israel
two thousand years ago, the Spanish Inquisition, and even the Holocaust) as
192 Differentiating among the stages also is relevant to determining what contemporary American
institutional features could justifiably be altered as society shifts over time.
193 I am grateful to Steve Smith for raising this point.
194 See GENESIS 44:4-8.
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part of a divine plan, 195 and Mormons have similarly conceptualized the
persecutions they suffered.196
More generally, the “nullity challenge” can be formulated as follows:
from the perspective of a religion that believes in divine providence, nothing
can be said to be “necessary” from the political authorities. Whatever
happens is divinely guided, and the religion’s adherents will be able to cope,
and may even be better off for it.
The nullity challenge is readily answered. The fact that a religion has
the theological resources to explain disasters ex post does not mean that the
religion voluntarily invites disasters ex ante. The original position concerns ex
ante decision-making: what political arrangements would individuals think it
fair to select, not knowing whom they actually represent? I know of no
religion that advises its adherents to opt for persecution. It is only in relation
to such a religion, if any exists, that the nullity challenge would be valid, and
partial validity would not undermine the Religious Institution Principle’s valid
application in respect of all other religions.
Having disposed of the nullity challenge, let us proceed to consider
the contents of the Religious Institution Principle’s “necessity” requirement.
To begin, there is an ambiguity: does necessary mean ‘merely useful’, or
‘indispensable’ in the sense that without it an adherent would be unable to
develop and fully exercise her religion’s conception of the good?197 The
answer likely turns on basic facts of the society in question, and hence is
answerable only at Rawls’ second stage. In the large heterogeneous society
that is contemporary America, the Religious Institution Principle’s necessity
requirement can extend only to protecting what is indispensable.
Interpreting necessity to include what is “useful” would be too costly, and
would lead to too many problematic conflicts with the legitimate interests of
non-religious citizens. More on this soon. 198
This leads to the second possible objection to the Religious
Institution Principle’s necessity requirement: is it under-protective? Put
differently, why would a person in the original position, knowing that she
might represent a religious person, agree to the Religious Institution
Principle, insofar as it provides only the minimal protections as to what was
indispensable for religious adherents’ self-realization? It is best to address

See generally ELIEZER BERKOVITZ, F AITH AFTER THE HOLOCAUST .
See, e.g., Ronald E. Poelman, Adversity and the Divine Purpose of Mortality, ENSIGN, at 23 (May 1989).
197 Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413-14 (1819).
198 See infra Part IV.B.3.
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this important question later, after having fully worked out the Religious
Institution Principle’s contents.199
2.

“from the internal perspective of the religious community”

Under the Religious Institution Principle, necessity is determined
from the religious community’s internal perspective.200 This “Internal
Perspective” requirement follows from the veil of ignorance: a person in the
original position, not knowing whether she represented a person belonging
to a majority or minority religion, would not agree to allowing what is
religiously necessary to be determined by the societal majority, which might
have different religious understandings.
The Internal Perspective requirement carries a second important
implication: what matters is the perspective of the religion’s formal leaders,
not its lay members. The principle presupposes the continued existence of
necessary religious institutions, and religious institutions can survive only if
the formal leaders’ understandings of the institution’s requirements are
determinative. 201 So long as dissenters are free to exit from one church and
join (or establish) another – a requirement discussed below 202 – people in the
original position accordingly would agree that the religion’s formal leaders
determine the religion’s internal perspective.203

See infra Part V.C.
This is consistent with what has come to be known as the church autonomy doctrine. See Watson
v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 727 (1872) (stating that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastic rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which
the matter has been carried, the [state’s] legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final . . .”); see
also Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94,
116 (1952) (speaking of the power of “religious organizations” to “decided for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”).
201 This can be satisfied by a rule that gave weight to lay sensibilities, so long as such a rule of
recognition were identified by the institution’s leaders. More generally, religious institutions require
law, cf. LOCKE, supra note 126, at 16, law presupposes a rule of recognition, see H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 100-110 (1961), and a non-governmental institution’s rule of recognition must come
from its formal leaders, or else law and the institution will “dissolve and break in pieces.” LOCKE, supra
note 126, at 16.
202 See infra Part IV.B.2.
203 This does not mean that society must automatically accept whatever it is that one of the institution’s
spokespersons says is its internal perspective. Absolute deference to the institution’s spokesperson
would not be selected in the original position because such a rule self-evidently would be liable to
abuse by religious institutions, and for that reason could not be generalized as a rule that would be
applicable to all religions (as all rules chosen in the original position must be). Accordingly,
government necessarily must be involved in determining what constitutes the religious institution’s
internal perspective for purposes of the Religious Institution Principle. A rule of absolute deference to
the “deci[sions] by the highest of the[] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried” is one
possibility. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 727. A full exploration of how government is to determine the
religion’s internal perspective is an important question that lies beyond this Article’s scope.
199
200
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********************
I shall now proceed to a discussion of several of the many
implications that flow from the Religious Institution Principle.
C.

What Counts as a Religious Institution?

What counts as a ‘religious institution’ for purposes of the Religious
Institution Principle? The guiding criterion is whether a particular institution
is necessary, from the religion’s internal perspective, for its adherents to fully
develop and exercise their conception of the good. Churches, synagogues,
and mosques readily qualify.
1. What Does Not: Against the Slippery Slope
Before considering what other institutions might qualify as religious
institutions, it will be helpful to clarify some that would not. Illuminating in
its own right, this discussion also provides a response to one of Schragger
and Schwartzman’s arguments, referred to above, 204 against the proposition
that churches deserve “a special constitutional status.” 205 Though directed to
Separate Spherists, their argument also applies to the Religious Institution
Principle since it too grants religious institutions special protections.
Schragger and Schwartzman cite Robert Putnam for the proposition
that “there do not appear to be decisive differences between churches,
bowling leagues, and coffee houses.” 206 After initially qualifying this
equivalence, 207 Schragger and Schwartzman conclude “it is extraordinarily
problematic to recognize and distinguish some conscience-based
organizations over others” and that “[a]s a matter of political theory, such a
distinction violates a central principle of equality.” 208 This equivalence is the
ground for two conclusions that are crucial to their position. First, is their
slippery slope conclusion that churches cannot be given special protection;
protecting churches, they suggest, would demand that special protections
also be granted to all these other organizations as well, an impossibility on
pragmatic and normative grounds. Second is their doctrinal conclusion that
churches should be treated interchangeably with the Boy Scouts, political
parties, and newspapers; they assimilate churches into the doctrinal categories
See supra text accompanying notes 115-117.
and Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 5.
206 Id. at 35 & n. 154.
207 See id. at 35 (“It is certainly possible that religious institutions are sociologically significant – akin to
state, market, and family as an organizing principle of social life” such that “our lives may revolve
around churches to such a degree that they are deserving of special treatment.”).
208 Id. at 36.
204

205 Schragger
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of freedom of association and expressive association that govern these other
institutions, and conclude that religious institutions are entitled to no
additional constitutional protections. 209
The Religious Institution Principle, however, provides a basis for
distinguishing among these institutions. What matters is whether an
institution is viewed by participants in the original position, or those at the
second stage, as being part of the “background institutional conditions
necessary for the development and the full informed exercise of” a
conception of the good.210 While some non-religious institutions may
qualify, 211 most of Schragger and Schwartzman’s examples would not – it is
inconceivable that bowling leagues, the Boy Scouts, or newspapers would
count, and political parties probably also would not. So while Schragger and
Schwartzman might be correct that churches are “not unique,” 212 their
argument that treating churches specially would entail extending the same
protections to all these other institutions is answerable from Rawls’
perspective.
The Religious Institution Principle sheds light on another criticism
propounded by Schwartzman and Schragger. They assert that religious
institutionalists must “claim not only that religion is good but that organized
religion facilitates, promotes, or is constitutive of that good.”213 Not so from
Rawls’ social contractarian perspective. What matters is not the truth of
whether religion is good (and the truth of organized religion’s connection to
that good), but the likely perception of the person behind the veil of ignorance
(or at the second stage) who participates in the original position; the person
behind the veil recognizes that she might be religious, so the truth of
religion’s relation to goodness is not relevant. Stated differently, what
matters is the empirical (rather than ontological) question of whether
religious persons in the society that is the object of the original position or
second stage think religious institutions are necessary for their religious
flourishing. The answer certainly is “yes” for people in today’s United States.

209 As to freedom of association, Schragger and Schwartzman state that Boy Scouts and Hosanna-Tabor
“appear to be justified by a similar set of arguments and are grounded in a similar concern for freedom
of conscience.” See id. at 56. As to expressive associations, Schartzman and Schragger argue against
church exemption from labor laws on the ground that “[t]here is no reason that firms or corporations
with expressive or conscientious missions (for example newspapers or political parties) cannot also
offer good reasons to be immune from employment laws.” Id. at 59.
210 Id. at 19.
211 As explained later, the Religious Institution Principle does not negate the possibility of what might
be called a “Non-Religious Institution Principle.” See infra Part V.D.1.
212 Id. at 30.
213Id. (emphasis in original).
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Beyond Churches

So what institutions beyond churches, synagogues and mosques
would count as religious institutions?
a.

Educational Institutions

To begin, some educational institutions almost certainly would be
included, though difficult questions quickly arise. The Religious Institution
principle requires the existence of institutions that allow for the formulation
of a conception of the good, and while this undoubtedly demands some
educational autonomy for religious groups,214 it does not automatically follow
that there must be separate parochial schools for each religion’s children, or
religious universities for its young adults. If a religion does not believe that
separate schools are necessary for its adherents to develop and live in
accordance with the religion’s conception of the good, then schools are not a
religious institution for that religion.
b.

The “Differentiated Approach”

This suggests that what counts as a religious institution may vary
across religions, on the reasonable assumption that different religions have
differing understandings of what institutions are necessary for their adherents
to flourish. Call this the ‘Differentiated Approach’ to identifying religious
institutions. It might be thought that the Differentiated Approach
constitutes a floor, not a ceiling, meaning that a state could conclude that all
religions should be treated equally for purposes of identifying religious
institutions.215 Call this the ‘Undifferentiated Approach.’
Though counterintuitive, the first principle of justice requires the
Differentiated Approach in societies with heterogeneous populations. As
explained later, there are legitimate limits on the degree to which justice
requires that a liberal state accommodate the needs of religious groups, one
of which is political stability.216 Now consider this: it is conceivable that (1)
one religion could, from its internal perspective, require a particular
institution that no other religions need, and that (2) accommodating that
particular religious institution would be consistent with political stability only
in small doses, i.e., that accommodating the religious institution would not be
possible if like accommodations had to be extended to all religions. This
See Rosen, Educational Autonomy, supra note 26.
is not hard to imagine arguments for the Undifferentiated Approach. It might be thought that the
Differentiated Approach is fundamentally unfair because it treats different religions differently, or that
the Undifferentiated Approach is administratively simpler.
216 See infra Part IV.B.1.
214
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shows that the Undifferentiated Approach unnecessarily limits the range of
religions that could be accommodated in the liberal society. This possibility
would lead people in an original position to reject the Undifferentiated
Approach because it might mean that the person they represent would not be
able to realize her conception of the good. The Differentiated Approach to
determining what counts as a religious institution is preferable, in other
words, because it expands the range of citizens with reasonable
comprehensive views that the liberal state can accommodate, thereby
increasing the extent to which the first principle of justice can be realized.
c.

Hospitals and Economic Enterprises

Let us return to the question of what if any institutions apart from
churches and (some) educational institutions may qualify as a religious
institution from the religion’s Internal Perspective. Some religions (Judaism
and Islam, for example) have highly developed systems of courts and
business law. 217 Does the Religious Institution Principle demand that they be
allowed to function as parallel, independent legal systems outside of the
state’s contract and business law? No. Both Judaism and Islam have the
functional equivalent of choice-of-law rules that permit religious contract and
business law to be displaced by state law. 218 As such, it cannot be said that,
from these religions’ internal perspectives, their systems of contract law are
necessary for their adherents to live in accordance with their conception of
the good. Accordingly, their courts and business law would not qualify as
religious institutions.
To be clear, this conclusion does not mean it would be wrongful for
a state to accommodate them, as the United States currently does by allowing
religious tribunals to resolve disputes pursuant to religious law among people
who voluntarily submit to their jurisdiction and then allowing state
mechanisms to help enforce the tribunals’ judgments. 219 From the
perspective of the Religious Institution Principle, however, this is a policy
choice, not a requirement of the first principle of justice.
Would hospitals qualify as religious institutions? The answer turns
on whether religious hospitals are necessary, from the religion’s internal
See generally SHULCHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat; Mohammad Fadel, Islamic and American Law:
Between Concordance and Dissonance, 57 N.Y.L.S. L. REV . 231, 232-36 (2012-2013).
218 See, e.g., Michael J. Broyde, The Role of Secular Law in Halakha: A Brief Response to Gerald Blidstein and
a Note on Jewish Legal Theory, 2 M EOROT 6, 10 (2008) (treating the Jewish legal category of dina
de’malchuta dina as a choice-of-law provision); Fadel, supra note 217, at 236-37 (discussing “treaty”
approach to legal obligations of Muslims who live in non-Muslim majority countries).
219 See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal
Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011).
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perspective, for its adherents to fully develop and exercise their conception
of the good. This question probably is most pressing vis-à-vis Catholicism.
While I am not in a position to answer it from that tradition’s internal
perspective, a few observations can be made. Even assuming that “service
lies at the core” of Catholicism, 220 need service be provided in a religious
hospital (or in a religious social service organization)? On the one hand, the
religious individual may equally be able to provide service in a public
hospital, and thereby fulfill her vocational calling. On the other hand, the
religion might understand the provision of service through a religiously
identified organization to be a necessary means of providing witness of God
to the world. An internal perspective of this sort would suggest that the
hospital (or other social service organization) is a religious institution for that
religion, under the Differentiation Approach. Under this logic, some
corporations also may qualify as religious institutions.221
D.

Overlapping Spheres

Even if a Catholic hospital (or other organization) qualified as a
religious institution, that would not mean that governmental regulation of
that institution (for instance the contraception mandate) necessarily would be
wrongful, for two reasons. First, as explained immediately below in Section
E, the Religious Institution Principle does not protect religious institutions
from all laws, but has finite “coverage.” Second, as explained in the next
Part IV, even as to those laws to which the Religious Institution Principle
applies, its protections are not absolute. For these two reasons, the Religious
Institution Principle does not generate a political architecture of Separate
Spheres in which religious institutions are jurisdictionally separate from, or
otherwise independent of, the government. Instead, the Religious Institution
Principle leads to a system of overlap between government and religious
institutions.
E.

Coverage: The Scope of Presumptive Protections
1. Why Many Laws Fall outside the Principle’s Coverage

The scope of the laws to which the Religious Institution Principle
extends is determined by the logic that gives rise to the principle: the
principle’s coverage extends only to laws that threaten to disable religious
institutions from facilitating adherents’ abilities to develop and live in
accordance with the religion’s conception of the good. Most governmental
laws do not, and for that reason do not fall within the Religious Institution
220
221

Berg, supra note 15, at 5.
See, e.g., Vischer, supra note 15.
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Principle’s coverage. This is true, for instance, of tax laws, and most labor
and zoning laws. 222 More generally, the Religious Institution Principle does
not protect religious institutions from governmental laws that address
behaviors about which a religion does not take a position, or laws that
prohibit behavior that the religion also proscribes (such as sexual abuse).
The only caveat is this: the Religious Institution Principle would be triggered
if such laws were administered in a way that undermined the institution’s
ability to facilitate adherents’ development and living in accord with the
religion’s conception of the good. For instance, while tax laws are not per se
problematic, an excessive tax that risked bankrupting religious institutions
would come under the Religious Institution Principle’s coverage.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Religious Institution Principle does not
extend to laws simply because they are contrary to the religion’s
commitments. Instead, the principle applies only if the law’s application
threatens to undermine the institution’s capability of facilitating adherents’
ability to formulate and live in accordance with the religion’s conception of
the good. This has particular relevance to the contraception mandate.
Assume for present purposes that Catholic hospitals are religious institutions.
The relevant question for determining the scope of the Religious Institution
Principle’s coverage is not whether Catholicism supports the use of
contraception. Instead, the question is whether a Catholic hospital’s
compliance with a law requiring that they provide their employees with
insurance covering contraception undermines the role hospitals play in
facilitating Catholics’ abilities to formulate and live in accordance with
Catholicism’s conception of the good. While fully answering this question
from an internal Catholic perspective lies beyond this Article’s scope, this
much can be said: it is not self-evident that the contraception mandate come
within the Religious Institution Principle’s coverage.
Importantly, coverage is not a function of individual conscience, the
institution’s “conscience,” 223 or members’ free exercise claims. 224 This is not
to suggest that the Religious Institution Principle displaces an individual’s
free exercise claim; it does not. 225 But free exercise should not be run
222 To be clear, the first principle of justice does not indicate that exemptions from these sorts of laws
(for example tax exemptions for clergy) are unjust, just that they are not required as a matter of first
principles.
223 In a characteristically thoughtful and carefully reasoned piece, Kent Greenawalt analyzes religious
institutional autonomy using the paradigm of conscience. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Tolerance and
Claims of Conscience (draft on file with author). Such an approach is in tension with the Religious
Institution Principle for the reasons explained above.
224 Pace Schragger and Schwartzman, who argue that the only constitutional claims that institutions can
assert are free exercise claims of their members. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 62.
225 For example, the claim available to the priest who has to sign the check for insurance under the
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together with the question of whether application of a law threatens to
undermine a religious institution’s capability of facilitating adherents’
development and realization of the good. Institutions are different from
individuals, and the protections that are appropriate for institutions may be
greater, or lesser, than what is owed to individuals, depending upon the
circumstance.
These guidelines have important implications for the nascent
ministerial exception doctrine. The Supreme Court recently ruled in HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC 226 that employment
discrimination claims cannot be asserted against churches in relation to
employment decisions concerning the church’s ministers. This is far more
expansive (and narrower in some respects as well, as explained immediately
below) than what the Religious Institution Principle endorses. Under the
principle, religious institutions do not have blanket immunity from
governmental laws that bear on the hiring of its ministers. Rather, the
Religious Institution Principle covers only those laws affecting the
employment of ministers -- and potentially non-ministers as well -- that
threaten to undermine the religious institution’s ability to enable their
adherents to develop and live in accordance with the religion’s conception of
the good.227 It is hard to see why the American with Disabilities Act – the
federal law at issue in Hosanna-Tabor, which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability -- would come under the principle’s coverage. 228
There are two possible arguments under the Religious Institution
Principle in support of the ministerial exception. First is a claim that the
ADA is administered in a manner that endangers the religious institution’s
ability to facilitate adherents’ development of, and ability to live in
accordance with, the religion’s conception of the good. This would be true
if, for instance, hiring and termination decisions regularly led to costly and
lengthy lawsuits that interfered with a religious institution’s ability to be led
by its members’ preferred leader.229 But this would mean that a ministerial
HHS mandate should not be confused with whatever claim the hospital may have as a religious
institution.
226 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
227 It is quite possible that non-ministers – indeed, that all employees in a religious institution – could
satisfy this requirement. Cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987)
(interpreting statutory exemption for religious organizations to employ “individuals of a particular
religion” to include a janitor for church-owned gymnasium).
228 To be sure, it is not inconceivable that a religion could have commitments inconsistent with the
Americans with Disabilities Act. For example, the Pentateuch prohibits priests with enumerated
physical infirmities from working in the Temple in Jerusalem. See LEVITICUS 21:16-24. But this
limitation has never been understood as carrying over to rabbis, or to have operation outside of the
Temple, and accordingly has no practical application to Jewish religious practice in the United States.
229 For such an argument, see Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N. CAROL.

Rosen

Religious Institutions and the State: A Liberal Theory

44

exception might be required as a pragmatic matter, though not as a matter of
first principles. Accordingly, pragmatic steps that remedied administrability
concerns for religious institutions would then permit the law to be applied.
Second, it might be claimed that the ministerial exception is an
appropriate simplifying prophylactic rule for purposes of courts. This would
require elaboration of a sort that has not yet been provided, and about which
I am initially skeptical.
2. Laws Falling Within the Principle’s Coverage
a.

Some examples

What types of laws would fall within the Religious Institution
Principle’s coverage? Consider first a New York law that required every
Russian Orthodox church in the state to treat as authoritative the
determinations of the governing body of North American churches, rather
than the Patriarch locum tenens of Moscow.230 That law threatened the
ongoing integrity of the Russian Orthodox church, from that religion’s
internal perspective.231 The Supreme Court overturned this law in the 1950s,
a disposition that is consistent with the Religious Institution Principle.232
A surprising number of laws similarly have interfered with particular
churches’ internal governance. For example, many nineteenth century
property laws applicable to churches “reflected a Protestant democratic
perspective on ecclesiastical structure under which congregants are the
foundation of a church, own church property, and contract with clergy.” 233
These statutes “restricted the amount of land a religious organizations could
possess,” “limited the annual value and income of real or personal property
held by religious organizations,” and “regulated the structure of religious
organizations, often in ways that empowered the laity.” 234 Scholars have
concluded that such laws were “fundamentally inconsistent with Catholic
doctrine holding that ownership lies in the Church itself which determines
L. REV . 1, 23 (2011).
230 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94,
96-102 (1952) (striking down this law). This case is frequently discussed by scholars under the rubric
of “church autonomy.” See generally Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEORGETOWN J.
OF LAW & PUB . POL ’Y 253 (2009).
231 See id. at 258 (“Differences in church governance reflect deep theological disagreements”); see also
supra note 201.
232 See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116. The statement above in text assumes that there are no sufficiently
important countervailing reasons that could justify infringement of the Religious Institution Principle.
233 See Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions (draft on file with author, at
37); Philip Hamburger, Illiberal Liberalism: Liberal Theology, Anti-Catholicism, and Church Property, 12 J.
CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 693, 709-10 (2002).
234 Brownstein, supra note 233, at 34-36.
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the rights of its parishioners.” 235 These laws would come under the Religious
Institution Principle’s coverage if, as likely is true, undercutting concentration
of power and authority in priests were viewed by the Catholic Church as
imperiling the institution’s capability of facilitating its adherents’ ability to
develop and live in accordance with the Catholic Church’s conception of the
good.
A more recent example can be seen in Professor Barak Richman’s
campaign to apply antitrust laws to the clergy hiring practices of the
movement for Conservative Judaism. 236 The Conservative movement
requires member congregations to hire from a list of rabbis drawn up by the
movement. Richman argues that this constitutes an unlawful cartel, and that
congregations should be able to hire whomever they wish. The Conservative
movement claims that such control is necessary for the Conservative
movement to “set standards for worship, ritual and religious law, and to
ensure that only rabbis committed to those standards lead congregations.” 237
“If each congregation is deciding for itself, some of these decisions will dilute
the ability of this worldwide group of people to promote its vision
worldwide.” 238 Assuming that the Conservative movement constitutes a
religious institution, the Religious Institution Principle’s coverage would
extend to the antitrust laws. 239
b.

How Individualism Under-Protects

Property laws restricting church’s property ownership and antitrust
laws interfering with clergy appointment give rise to one type of harm that
Individualism overlooks. Recall that Schragger and Schwartzman argue that
“general principles of freedom of association, privacy, and conscience are
sufficient to protect all conscience-based associations, including churches,” 240
and that free exercise claims can be asserted only if individual members of
the church “have been burdened in their free exercise of religion.” 241 It is
not at all clear that these individual-based concepts and doctrines would
condemn the abovementioned applications of property restrictions and
Id. at 37.
See Samuel G. Freedman, Seeing and Battling a ‘Cartel’ in the Hiring of Rabbis, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(August 24, 2012).
237 Id.
238 Id. (quoting Rabbi Julie Schonfeld, Executive Vice President of the Conservative movement’s
Rabbinical Assembly).
239 As explained above, the Religious Institution Principle’s contents are determined on the basis of the
internal perspective of the religion’s leaders. See supra Part III.B.2. For this reason, what matters is the
Conservative Movement’s views of what their movement requires, not the views of a lay member like
Professor Richman.
240 Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 16, at 5.
241 Id. at 63.
235
236
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antitrust law. 242 But the Religious Institution Principle does: such laws
interfere with a religious institution’s capability, from its internal perspective,
of facilitating its adherents’ development and living in accordance with the
religion’s conception of the good. People in the original position would want
to guard against such harms to religious institutions, even if such laws do not
harm identifiable individuals through the causation mechanisms utilized to
adjudicate individuals’ claims.
Two hypotheticals shed additional light on how Individualism underprotects religious institutions. Imagine first a federal law that requires large
employers to make federally funded and provided contraceptive devices
available in their bathrooms, to be stocked by federal workers for employers
with ideological objections. Would it be proper for the first law to be applied
to Catholic hospitals? To Churches? Second, consider a law aimed at
combatting unsupervised binge drinking that compels all colleges to allow
alcoholic bars on their campuses, to be funded and operated by the
government for any colleges with ideological objections. Can this law be
applied to a Mormon or Islamic university, though each religion prohibits the
consumption of alcohol by its co-religionists?
As with the property ownership and antitrust laws, it is not clear why
any of these applications would be problematic under Individualism. After
all, Schragger and Schwartzman parry objections to the contraception
mandate on the ground that “[u]nless churches have their own consciences
(and we have already argued that they do not), the institutional context does
not add anything to the plaintiffs’ claim,” and they conclude that the only
sort of claim that properly can be asserted is that “the individuals comprising
those groups have been burdened in their free exercise of religion.”243 Since
the abovementioned hypothetical laws do not compel any religious person to
do anything, no individual would appear to have a free exercise claim to
press. 244 This conclusion is symptomatic of the Individualism’ shortcomings.
The two proposed laws impose a real harm that ought to matter to political
theory and law, but that is not captured by Individualism’s reduction of
religious institutions to its members.
More generally, there are two types of harms overlooked by
Individualism, but protected by the Religious Institution Principle. The first
242 Perhaps the priest in whom the property otherwise would have vested could assert an individualbased free exercise or statutory claim. In any event, an individual-focused claim misconceives the crux
of the law’s harms, which are to the institution rather than the individual priest.
243 Schragger and Schwartman, supra note 16, at 63.
244 See also Corbin, supra note 7, at 158 (arguing that the contraception mandate is legally
unproblematic because “genuine and independent decisions of private individuals . . . br[eak] the chain
of attribution linking the religious conduct and the state”).
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might be called “sacred space” harms. Many religions believe that they
require sacred spaces, which are created by physical attributes (such as size,
beauty, and materials) as well as the persons and behaviors that are present -and absent -- from the space. Sacred spaces may be important even if no
individual has a duty to visit, and if the space is forbidden to some coreligionists. Restricting a church’s property ownership threatens harm to a
religion’s sacred space if a priest-apexed hierarchy is, from the religion’s
internal perspective, a necessary element of its sacred space. Likewise, a law
requiring government-stocked contraceptive devices to be available in church
restrooms likely would violate a religion’s understanding of sacred space. For
these reasons, there can be meaningful harm even if a law does not impose
harms on identifiable individuals that are ascertainable by the causation
analysis used to evaluate individuals’ claims.
Second, Individualism overlooks what might be called “witnessing”
harms. Imagine a law that threatened the continued existence of religious
hospitals or charitable organizations, but that did not interfere with the ability
of religious individuals to work for non-religious hospitals and charities. It is
not clear why such a law would be problematic under Individualism insofar
as individual doctors would be able to continue their social service work.
The Religious Institution Principle, by contrast, has the conceptual resources
for explaining why such a law may be problematic. A religion’s conception
of the good may include obligations that fall on the entire religious
community rather than only individuals. One such obligation may be bearing
witness of the fact of God to non-coreligionists, and the religious hospitals
and charitable organizations may be deemed indispensable to accomplishing
this; good works undertaken by large groups of religious individuals united
by religion may communicate God’s presence in a way that an individual’s
good works cannot. People in an original position would want to protect
their religious community’s capability of realizing this aspect of their
conception of the good, just as they would want to protect the individual’s
ability to formulate and live in accordance with their religion’s conception of
the good.
IV.

LIMITS TO THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION PRINCIPLE

Even as to laws fall within the Religious Institution Principle’s
coverage, the principle does not provide absolute protections for two
reasons. First, the members of some religious traditions may not be
permitted to ‘sit at the table’ and participate in the original position, and
therefore the chosen basic political structure may not accommodate them or
their religious institutions. I discuss the criteria for drawing the line between
participating and excluded religious traditions in Part IV.A. Second, as
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regards participating religious traditions, Rawls’ first principle of justice gives
religious institutions generous, but non-absolute, protections. I explore these
substantive limitations on religious institutions in Part IV.B.
A. Threshold Eligibility Requirements
Rawls carefully defines who it is that is imagined to be a participant in
the original position: only people who satisfy the “the political conception of
the person.” 245 Defining the political conception of the person is therefore
critical, for it is only people who satisfy the conditions of the political
conception of the person whose interests must be taken into account when
setting up the basic structure of the just state. Persons who fall outside the
political conception of the person are not guaranteed that their interests will
be protected because people in the original position need not consider that
they may represent such persons. 246 Accordingly, the political structure
chosen under the original position will not extend protections to all religions
nor, by extension, to all religions’ religious institutions.
We now are in a position to see a crucial distinction between Separate
Spherists and the Religious Institution Principle. The logic of Separate
Sphere suggests that its conclusions apply to all churches. From the
perspective of the Religious Institution Principle, by contrast, religious
institutions do not have inherent autonomy simply by virtue of the fact that
they are religious institutions. Further, what makes a religion eligible is not a
function of age; the fact that a church may have “preexisted the state” 247 does
not trigger the Religious Institution Principle. Instead, eligibility is
determined by the characteristics of the religious community.
What are those characteristics? According to Rawls, the political
conception of the person “begins from our everyday conception of persons
as the basic units of thought, deliberation, and responsibility.” 248 Under it,
people are “seen as capable of revising and changing [their conception of the
good] on reasonable and rational grounds, and they may do this if they so
desire.” 249 Rawls clearly thinks that most religions’ understanding of
personhood satisfy the political conception of the person, and hence that
participants in the original position would have to consider that they might
RAWLS, P OLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 29.
Id. at 103.
247 Esbeck, supra note 10, at 55.
248 Id. at 20. Elsewhere I have argued that this is narrower than necessary, and that maximally
broadening participants in the original position better realizes Rawls’ foundational objectives. See
Rosen, Educational Autonomy, supra note 26, at 12-20.
249 Id. at 30; see also id. at 31-32 and 302.
245
246
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Some religions (and non-religious
represent a religious person. 250
comprehensive views), however, do not satisfy the political conception of the
person, and hence would not be represented at the original position. Below I
will explore in detail the characteristics of excluded religions, and explain why
such exclusion is justifiable.251 For now, it is sufficient to note that the
Religious Institution Principle does not protect all religions simply by virtue
of the fact that they are religions.
B.

Permissible Substantive Limits on Religious Institutions

Rawls concludes that participants in the original position will select
two principles of justice. As explained above, the Religious Institution
Principle is derived from the first principle of justice. But the first principle
of justice imposes many other requirements, some of which apply to the
Religious Institutional Principle itself.
To review, the first principle of justice is that “[e]ach person has an
equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.” “Fully adequate
scheme” refers to the “criterion . . . to specify and adjust the basic liberties so
as to allow the adequate development and the full and informed exercise of
both moral powers in the social circumstances under which the two
fundamental cases arise in the well-ordered society in question.” 252 Relevant
for present purposes is the “second fundamental case,” which “is connected
with the capacity for a (complete) conception of the good (normally
associated with a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine),
and concerns the exercise of citizens’ powers of practical reason in forming,
revising, and rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete life.” 253
The first principle accordingly provides three limitations that operate
on the Religious Institution Principle itself: the first principle of justice (1)
presumes a “well-ordered society,” (2) demands that the scheme of liberty be
“compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all,” and (3) understands
that the basic liberties will be “specif[ied] and adjust[ed]” to allow for the full
and informed exercise of all citizens’ two moral powers.

250 Evidence of this pervades Rawls’ work. One of Rawls’ aims is to explain why people holding
various “comprehensive views,” which for him includes religious persons, would agree to structure
government on the basis of “political” (rather than their comprehensive) views that all citizens can
reasonably be expected to endorse. See generally id. at 3-130; 212-54.
251 See infra Part V.C.
252 RAWLS, P OLITICAL LIBERALISM, at 333.
253 Id.
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1. The “Well-Orderedness” Requirement
The first principle of justice presumes a “well-ordered society,”
meaning a polity in which “citizens have a normally effective sense of justice”
such that “they generally comply with society’s basic institutions, which they
regard as just.” 254 Well-orderedness requires conditions that permit and
promote an “enduring and secure” political regime,255 thereby avoiding
sectarian conflicts of the sort found in the centuries-long European wars of
religion.256
The well-orderedness requirement has many implications. First,
liberalism can only accommodate religions committed to peace with noncoreligionists in the sense that the religion does not aspire to use government
to coerce conversion or religious practice.257 This requirement, like the
political conception of the person, means that liberalism cannot
accommodate all religions. The absence of such a limit would threaten to
reintroduce the sectarian conflicts that liberalism has largely eliminated. 258
More than this, well-orderedness imposes important limitations on
those religious institutions (and individuals) that can be accommodated by a
liberal state. The Religious Institution Principle does not protect practices
that threaten general society’s well-orderedness. The well-orderedness
requirement thus justifies the Court’s approach, though not necessarily its
outcome, in Reynolds v. United States. 259 The Court in Reynolds upheld a
polygamy ban on the ground that polygamy threatened to undermine general
society’s moral fabric. 260 Of course, whether the Court was correct that
polygamy presented such a danger is an empirical question that the wellorderedness requirement cannot answer. 261 Further, even if the Court was
correct when the case was decided, the answer to what well-orderedness
demands necessarily turns on time-specific cultural sensibilities and practices.
Reynold’s holding accordingly cannot be assumed to be eternally valid.

Id. at 35.
Id. at 38.
256 See id. at xxviii.
257 Kent Greenawalt has suggested to me in conversation that this might be overly restrictive, and that
the size of the religious group and the threat it likely poses ought to be taken into account when
applying front-end restrictions. I respectfully disagree. Religions can grow quickly, and it is reasonable
to assume that people in the original position would not want to create a political structure that so
directly sowed the seeds of its own instability.
258 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM , supra note 22, at xxiii-xxvi.
259 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
260 Id. at 168.
261 This does not undermine well-orderedness’s utility, but only illustrates that difficult application
questions invariably will arise.
254
255
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What other practices would run afoul of well-orderedness? This can
only be answered at Rawls’ second stage, and any answer must be determined
on the basis of interlocking empirical and normative considerations. To
explain, it is an empirical question as to what (if any) practices in a religious
institution threaten the stability of larger society, and it is to be expected that
the answer will vary across societies and time. But what empirically is
destabilizing undoubtedly depends in part on a society’s views as to whether
accommodating minority comprehensive views is normatively desirable. As
explained above, people in the original position would be wary of selecting a
political structure that precluded them from developing and living in
accordance with the conception of the good that was held by the person they
represented. So the normative view that shapes the empirics must be as
welcoming to minority views as is possible.
To be more concrete, the following non-exhaustive list of practices –
all of which have been endorsed by some religions at some time – certainly
would run afoul of well-orderedness in today’s United States: child sacrifice,
adult sacrifice, sexual rituals involving children, corporal punishment, and
slaveholding. Discrimination on the basis of race may be a slightly harder
question, but I think it also would.262 Discrimination on the basis of gender,
sexual orientation, or religion, it seems to me, would not.
Importantly, well-orderedness also imposes affirmative obligations on
religious institutions. For example, well-orderedness creates educational
obligations that necessarily will fall on religious schools that qualify as
religious institutions. Students taught in religious schools must be educated
in a manner that encourages them to understand the justice of the polity in
which they live so that they willingly comply with the basic institutions of
society. It also is essential to equip them with the attitudes and habits
required to achieve and secure a stable democratic polity.263 In the end, what
education is required by well-orderedness is an empirical determination that
inevitably turns on human psychology and context-specific factors.
2.

The Compatibility Requirement

The first principle of justice calls for a basic structure that is
“compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.” This is another important
internal limitation to the Religious Institution Principle. To satisfy the
compatibility requirement, persons must have the right to opt-out of the
environment in which they find themselves.
262
263

Cf. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
I owe this formulation to a suggestion from Michael Walzer.
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To understand why, imagine a church that sought to flatly prohibit its
members from exiting. Persons living in a such a religious community who
did not share its adherents’ commitments and who felt that remaining in the
community impeded their ability to develop and realize their conception of
the good would not enjoy the same liberty enjoyed by a person who lived
outside the church and was satisfied by it. To make the liberty of members
of religious communities “compatible with a similar scheme of liberties” for
those who do not identify with religious communities, people in religious
communities must have the ability to opt-out and leave the community into
which they happened to be born.
The exit requirement means that religious institutions are severely
constrained in the respects in which they deal with people they deem to be
heretics. While some manner of informal communal censuring of heterodox
behavior is to be expected and would not be problematic, actions that
hindered adherents from leaving the community – like seizing their property,
or utilizing a communal property regime that did not afford fair
compensation for exiting members –could not be tolerated.
Many other practices could function as constraints on exit and hence
run afoul of the compatibility requirement. This has significant educational
ramifications: adherents must know something about life outside of their
religious community, and must have sufficient education to be able to survive
outside their community. 264 For another example, consider a religion that
deemed its family laws, which did not permit divorce, to be necessary for its
adherents’ development and living in accordance with the religion’s
conception of the good. Even if its family law otherwise qualified as a
religious institution, the compatibility requirement would not allow the
religious community to be immune from the state’s family law and to live in
accordance with its own. The same would be true of a religion whose family
laws permitted child marriage. Even if divorce were permitted, the cost of
divorce for persons who had entered into marriage at a young age probably
would be too great a constraint on free exit. (Of course child marriage might
be barred on the independent ground of well-orderedness).
As a final example, practices that unduly interfered with an adherent’s
ability to live a full and meaningful life outside the religious community
would violate compatibility’s exit requirement.
Extreme forms of
circumcision that disabled a person from reproducing, or that unduly limited
the chances that she would be able to find a mate outside the community,
would run afoul of this.
264

For a fuller discussion, see Rosen, Educational Autonomy, supra note 26.
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Accommodating Competing Liberties
a.

Rawls’ Approach

The first principle of justice states that the basic liberties must be
“specif[ied] and adjust[ed]” to allow for the full and informed exercise of all
citizens’ two moral powers.265 As a result, “[n]o basic liberty is absolute . .
.” 266 Instead, basic “liberties may conflict in particular cases and their claims
must be adjusted to fit into one coherent scheme of liberties.” 267 Such
adjustments mean that one “basic liberty can be limited or denied [only] for
the sake of one or more other basic liberties.” 268
This set of understandings importantly sets the Religious Institution
Principle apart from both Separate Spherists and Individualism. As to the
former, whereas the Separate Spherists spoke of church autonomy and
jurisdictional independence, Rawls understands that there can be competing
fundamental commitments that accordingly require adjustments and
limitations of all. Although the Religious Institution Principle is derived
from the basic liberties (insofar as religious institutions are necessary to allow
the full and informed development and exercise of a complete conception of
the good), the Religious Institution Principle cannot be absolute, pace the
Separate Spherists.
Second, whereas Lockean-premised Individualism provides neither a
principled justification for churches’ non-absolute protections nor guidance
for how churches’ interests should be reconciled with competing
commitments, the Religious Institution Principle does both. Churches’
protections cannot be absolute because there are multiple foundational
commitments that people would select behind a veil of ignorance: they
desire to create a well-ordered society in which everyone – regardless of what
comprehensive view they happen to have – has an opportunity to develop
and live in accordance with their complete conception of the good. Further,
original position participants’ choice of multiple basic liberties provides
substantial guidance in determining how liberties should be specified and
adjusted.
Rawls’ approach for specifying and adjusting (when they conflict) the
basic liberties can be usefully illustrated by considering the contraception
mandate controversy. Let us assume for present purposes that Catholic
P OLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 333.
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS , supra note 22, at 104.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 111.
265 RAWLS,
266
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hospitals qualify as a religious institution, and also that the contraception
mandate falls within the Religious Institutional Principle’s coverage. 269 These
assumptions do not automatically lead to the conclusion that the
contraception mandate was wrong, because there are two countervailing
considerations.
First, Rawls notes that the first principle of justice “may be preceded
by a lexically prior principle requiring that basic needs be met, at least insofar
as their being met is a necessary condition for citizens to understand and to
be able fruitfully to exercise the basic rights and liberties.” 270 What qualifies
as basic needs invariably must be determined at the second stage, and
supporters of the contraception mandate claim that women’s ability to
determine if and when they are to be pregnant is a basic need for women in
the United States. As was true of determining the scope of the Religious
Institution Principle, what matters is not the truth of this claim, but the
anticipated perception of people behind the veil of ignorance at either the
first or second stage. 271
Second, the contraception mandate may implicate another basic
liberty at the stage of the first principle of justice itself. Rawls refers to the
“liberty and integrity (physical and psychological) of the person” as a basic
liberty.272 Women’s access to contraception may implicate this physical and
psychological liberty. Rawls explains that physical and psychological integrity
are a basic liberty insofar as they “are necessary if the other basic liberties are
to be properly guaranteed.” 273 Contraception may be a prerequisite to these
physical and psychological liberties, which presume a “capacity for a
(complete) conception of the good (normally associated with a
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine), and concerns the
exercise of citizens’ powers of practical reason in forming, revising, and
rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete life.” 274 People in the
original position or second stage would recognize that reasonable people
could think that a woman’s ability to control her reproductive life is
necessary if she is to live in accordance with her conception of the good, and

As discussed above, neither of these assumptions is self-evidently correct.
See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS , supra note 22, at 44 & n. 7.
271 See supra text and accompanying note 213.
272 Id. at 113. Consider as well Rawls’ justification for the proposition that “[a]mong the basic rights is
the right to hold and to have the exclusive use of personal property.” He states that “[o]ne ground of
this right is to allow a sufficient material basis for personal independence and a sense of self-respect, both of which
are essential for the adequate development and exercise of the moral powers.” Id. at 114 (emphasis supplied). This
too might be grounds to conclude that access to contraception is a basic liberty.
273 Id. at 113.
274 Id.
269
270
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hence would understand that the basic liberties include access to
contraception.
It might be responded that women do not need contraception to
control their reproductive lives because they instead can be abstinent. But
this violates what Rawls calls the “strains of commitment,” which requires
that “those they represent [in the original position] can reasonably be
expected to honor the principle agreed to in the manner required by the idea
of an agreement.” 275 Insofar as “[t]he original position is framed to rule out
all excuses,” 276 participants must choose arrangements (including
specifications of liberty) which people plausibly can be expected to both
agree to and abide by. Accordingly, the suggestion that people behind a veil
would choose an arrangement that required sexual abstinence must be
rejected because it violates the strains of commitment.
If women’s access to contraception is a basic liberty, and if the
contraception mandate implicate the Religious Institution Principle, then the
mandate controversy involves a conflict among basic liberties. Rawls
provides substantial guidance as to how such conflicts should be managed.
“[A] liberty is more or less significant depending on whether it is more or less
essentially involve in, or is a more or less necessary institutional means to
protect, the full and informed exercise of the moral powers,” which
presumes a person’s “capacity for a (complete) conception of the good
(normally associated with a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral
doctrine), and concerns the exercise of citizens’ powers of practical reason in
forming, revising, and rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete
life.” 277 “The more significant liberties mark out the central range of
application of a particular basic liberty; and in cases of conflict we look for a
way to accommodate the more significant liberties within the central range of
each.” 278
Two additional points bear mention. First, determining the degree to
which the contraception mandate implicates these two liberties is nonobvious and controversial. As to the Religious Institution Principle, to what
degree does a requirement that Catholic hospitals fund health insurance
covering their employees’ contraceptive devices threaten Catholics’ ability to
develop and live in accordance with their religion’s conceptions of the good?
As to women employees’ liberty interests, to what degree is bodily and
psychological liberty undermined if a woman’s employer did not pay for
Id. at 103.
Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
275
276
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contraception, given the fact that until enactment of the Affordable Care Act
nobody was guaranteed that their employer would pay for contraception?
These and other considerations, which involve analysis at Rawls’ third and
fourth stages, are relevant to determining the degree to which the
contraception mandate controversy implicates countervailing basic liberties,
which is the first step to resolving conflicts among basic liberties. Further
analysis of these important issues necessarily lies beyond this Article’s scope.
Second, when conflicts among basic liberties are present, the
preferred approach is to eliminate the conflicts, if possible. To the extent the
Obama Administration’s recently proposed revisions of the HHS regulations
succeed in dissolving the conflict – they all are mechanisms under which
institutions apart from the religious hospitals fund contraception for
employees279 – the proposals are not just ‘smart politics,’ but are necessary as
a matter of the first principle of justice.
b.

Contemporary Constitutional Practice

Up to this point, this Article’s account of the Religious Institution
Principle has remained fully consistent with Rawls’ political theory. It is
important, however, to identify one significant respect in which Rawls
diverges sharply from contemporary United States constitutional practices,
and indeed the practices of virtually all other constitutional democracies. As
indicated above, Rawls identifies a category of “basic liberties” that are
lexically prior to other liberties in the sense that tradeoffs are permissible
only among basic liberties, but not between a basic and non-basic liberty. 280
Contemporary constitutional practice, by contrast, does not have a hierarchy
of constitutional liberties. Even more importantly, the ordinary practice is to
allow constitutional commitments to be traded off against competing subconstitutional commitments of sufficient importance in certain circumstances.
For instance, in the United States, constitutional principles of free speech
and equal protection allow for regulations that are narrowly designed to
realize interests that are “compelling” but not of constitutional dimension. 281
See Robert Pear, Compromise Idea for the Insuring of Birth Control, THE NEW YORK TIMES A1 (February
2, 2013).
280 See RAWLS , J USTICE AS FAIRNESS , supra note 22, at 111 (noting that “none of the basic liberties . . . is
absolute, as they may be limited when they conflict with one another.”); id. at 105 (rejecting the
approach that a basic liberty is “commensurable” with other “human interests” such that “for any two
interests, given the extent to which they are satisfied, there is always some rate of exchange at which a
rational person is willing to accept a lesser fulfillment of the one in return for a greater fulfillment of
the other, and vice versa”).
281See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (“Whenever the government treats any
person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within
the language and spirit of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. But that observation says
nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court
279
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In most other countries, constitutionally protected interests may be regulated
if there are sufficiently important sub-constitutional interests that satisfy
“proportionality” analysis.282
I cannot hope in this Article to consider whether Rawls’ more
restrictive approach to accommodating competing liberties is correct and, if
it is not, how it should be refitted.283 If Rawls’ approach merits refashioning,
however, then the Religious Institution Principle’s protections are even less
absolute, and the legitimate occasions for accommodating countervailing
interests are even more extensive, than the analysis in the preceding
subsection suggests.
C.

Summary of the Religious Institution Principle

The Religious Institution Principle gives rise to a four-step inquiry in
analyzing the normative strength of religious institutional claims: (1) Is the
proposed beneficiary a protected religion?, If so, (2) is it a religious
institution? If so, (3) does the governmental regulation fall within the
coverage of the Religious Institution Principle? And finally, if so, (4) are
there sufficiently important countervailing considerations that nonetheless
can justify a compromise of the religious institution’s interests?
V.

ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS

This final Part considers, and replies to, some difficult questions that
may be leveled at the Religious Institution Principle.
A.

What counts as a “Religion”?

It might be objected that the Religious Institution Principle is
problematic insofar as it requires government to define religion. The answer
is that such a demand already is made by the Constitution’s free exercise and
establishment clauses and the many statutes 284 that reference religion, and
applying strict scrutiny.”); Roe v. Wade, (holding that although fetuses are not a constitutional life
interest, the state has a sufficiently important interest in protecting the fetus that it may prohibit a
women from exercising her constitution right to abort under certain conditions); see generally
Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA . L. REV. 415, 429 (1993).
282See generally AHARON BARAK , PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND T HEIR
LIMITATIONS (2012); Jamal Greene, The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards, 99 GEO. L.J. 1289, 1291
(2011) (“[M]any of the world's most respected constitutional courts, including the courts of Canada,
Germany, Israel, India, and South Africa, in addition to the European Court of Human Rights and the
European Court of Justice, incorporate balancing into forms of proportionality analysis.”)
283 With one exception: below I suggest one reason for questioning Rawls’ approach. See infra text
accompanying notes 290-292.
284 Including but not limited to, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Religious LUIPA, stateRFRAs, employment laws, and tax code exemptions for houses of worship.
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that American law has successfully determined what counts as religion when
pressed to do so.285 Furthermore, definitional problems of religion may be
less acute under this Article’s proposal than the aforementioned
constitutional and statutory provisions insofar as non-religious commitments
also are entitled to protection (through the Non-Religious Institution
Principle286), thereby reducing the significance of religion’s definition.
A related objection asks how the Religious Institution Principle
would apply to a series of hypothetical religions, such as the “Church of
Gold” (which thought all its adherents had to be multi-millionaires or that its
churches had to be paved in gold) or the “Church of the Smokestack”
(whose mission embraced allowing its members to spew air pollution in their
professional lives). 287 To begin, many hypotheticals of this sort likely would
not be accorded the status of legitimate religions for purposes of the law.
But what if there were a legitimate religion whose mission either required
massive subsidies from government (as with the Church of Gold) or
demanded that government ignore the religion’s spillover effects (as with the
Church of the Smokestack)?
The answer is that the first principle of justice does not provide
absolute protections, and would not categorically require accommodation of
these religious institutions’ demands. As to the Church of Gold, the
Religious Institution Principle would not require government to give millions
of dollars to members of the Church of Gold because each person is only
entitled to “an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties
which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.” 288 Simply stated, the
liberty of being a multimillionaire is not compatible with a similar scheme of
liberties for all other citizens.289
As to the Church of the Smokestack, it seems that if it indeed were a
legitimate religion, then Rawls would conclude it must be accommodated
insofar as Rawls grants the liberty to live in accordance with one’s conception
of the good strict lexical priority to non-basic liberties.290
See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY7 (“The question of
what ‘religion’ means is theoretically intractable but, as a practical matter, barely relevant. We know it
when we see it.”).
286 See supra text and note 306.
287 I am thankful to Professor Tushnet and Professor Vermeule for these hypotheticals.
288 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM , supra note 22, at 291 (emphasis supplied).
289 A contrary conclusion would lead to the predictable (and impossible to accommodate) result of a
massive influx of converts to the Church of Gold. If that church sought to limit membership, then
offshoot independent churches undoubtedly would immediately sprout, leading to the same untenable
situation.
290 It seems unlikely that the protections afforded by the environmental regulations from which the
285
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This conclusion may constitute cause for reworking Rawls lexical
approach to basic liberties. As Rawls writes, “we can, of course, check the
priority of liberty [that Rawls endorses] by looking for counterexamples, and
consider whether, on due reflection, the resulting priority judgment can be
endorsed . . . . [I]f careful search uncovers no counter-cases, the priority of
liberty would be so far perfectly reasonable.” 291 Accordingly, if the Church
of the Smokestack constitutes a “counter-case” that strikes us upon
reflection as a mistaken priority judgment, then retaining the priority of
liberty is no longer “perfectly reasonable.” A plausible alternative is the
approach taken by today’s constitutional democracies of permitting
regulations of constitutional commitments when there are sufficiently
important countervailing considerations.292 Under it, the Church of the
Smokestack’s claim could be rejected on the ground that environmental laws
advance the sufficiently important governmental interest of protecting the
environment and guarding human health.
B.

Religious Persons and the Original Position

Why would a person in the original position, recognizing she might
represent an orthodox Catholic who believed that the Church has an
ontological institutional reality that precedes and is independent of the
state, 293 agree to the Religious Institution Principle, which permits some
secular interference with the Church? Instead, why wouldn’t a person in the
original position, recognizing she might represent an orthodox Catholic,
select a political structure that accorded churches the independence taught by
her religious tradition (or, following the differentiation principle, granted
independent status to those churches that, from their internal point of view,
have this ontological status)?
The answer is this: the person in the original position would not
select rules that allowed self-selecting churches to be independent of the state
because she recognizes that she might represent someone who were not an
orthodox Catholic. Granting carte blanche to any institution is never a free
lunch; it always comes at the expense of some individuals or other
institutions. For instance, a religious institution might reject the idea that
persons it deems to be members can exit from the church, and the person in
the original position might represent someone born into the church who
Church of the Smokestack seeks exemptions implicate a basic liberty. If it did – if the absence of
environmental protections could plausibly be said to violate citizens’ liberty of bodily integrity – then
its claims could be compromised even under Rawls’ framework.
291 RAWLS, J USTICE AS FAIRNESS , supra note 22, at 105-6.
292 See supra text and accompanying notes 26-27 and notes 282-285.
293 See supra text and accompanying note 30.
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wanted to leave. It is not sufficient to respond “but the Catholic Church
would not do this,” because granting independence to the Catholic Church
would entail granting independence to other churches as well.294 Recognizing
this, a person in the original position would not select a political structure
that allowed churches to be wholly independent of secular oversight.
Against this response, it might be asked why an orthodox Catholic
would agree to participate in the original position in the first place. Before
proceeding with an answer, it is important to observe that this is a challenge
that goes to the heart of Rawlsian political theory. I cannot provide a full
response here – Rawls spends literally hundreds of pages providing what in
effect is an answer 295 – though I momentarily will provide an executive
summary. But any response I give cannot hope to be complete insofar as
rejecting Rawls’ answer amounts to a wholesale rejection of Rawlsian political
theory, and fully defending Rawls’ political theory naturally lies beyond this
Article’s scope.
The core of the Rawlsian project is to equate justice with fairness, 296
and to posit that fair political institutions are those that would be chosen by
people if they were not self-interested. The problem is that everyone is selfinterested. The original position, as explained above, is a heuristic designed to
allow people to imagine what a non-self-interested perspective would be.297
This is not to suggest that there is no place for hardball politics of selfinterest under Rawls’ approach. There certainly is. But it comes after fair
democratic ‘rules of the road’ have been selected at the original position and
second stage; fair institutions and starting rules ensure that the results of
hardball politics themselves are fair. And Rawls’ heuristic is intended to aid
with the prior steps of establishing fair baseline institutions and procedures.
So the answer to as to why an orthodox Catholic would agree to
participate in the original position is this: it’s only fair to do so. It’s only fair
to choose those political institutions and arrangements that would be chosen
by people behind a veil of ignorance, who accordingly did not who it was
they represented.

See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS F AIRNESS, supra note 22, at 111 (noting that “however these liberties are
adjusted, that final scheme is to be secured equally for all citizens.”).
295 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM , supra note 22, at 3-172.
296 As the title of Rawls’ final book-length summary of his life’s work suggests: Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement.
297 See supra Part III.A.
294
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The Adequacy of the Religious Institution Principle

Even if one were to accept the answers provided in the immediately
preceding subsection (and thereby accept the original position and the first
principle of justice), the following objection still might be propounded: are
the protections afforded by the Religious Institution Principle adequate, such
that people in the original position would agree to them? This would
amount to a critique of this Article’s derivation of the Religious Institution
Principle, rather than the previous subsection’s wholesale attack on Rawls.
There are three respects in which the Religious Institution Principle
may be thought to inadequately protect religious institutions. First, the
Religious Institution Principle does not apply to all religions. Second, the
principle only covers matters that are “indispensable” for religious
institutions’ capabilities of facilitating adherents’ abilities to develop, and live
in accordance with, the religion’s conception of the good; it does not extend
to matters that are “helpful” for religious institutions. Third, even as to
covered matters, the Religious Institution Principle’s protections are not
absolute.
As a result of these three considerations, some religions’ religious
institutions may not be in a position to do what is necessary, from their
internal perspective, to allow their adherents to develop and live in
accordance with the religion’s conception of the good. If so, why would
people in the original position, understanding that they might represent a
person who belonged to such a religion, agree to the Religious Institution
Principle?
The answer must start with an acknowledgment that no single polity
can realistically accommodate all people. For instance, the United States
cannot tolerate the Taliban. Rawls operationalizes permissible exclusions
through the political conception of the person (PCP) insofar as only people
who satisfy the PCP participate in the original position.298 Those religious
traditions that reject the PCP’s assumptions that individuals are the “basic
units of thought and responsibility” are likely to embrace a commitment to
using political power to compel religious practice.299 The point of the

See supra Part IV.A.
Elsewhere I have explained the connection between Rawls’ definition of the PCP and governmental
compulsion of religious practices, and also suggested that Rawls’ definition of the PCP is unnecessarily
(and therefore problematically) broad. See Rosen, Educational Autonomy, supra note 26, at 12-20. What
matters for present purposes is not the precise scope of the PCP’s exclusion, but the fact that the
polity created by Rawlsian theory (as well as my reworking of it) does not purport to accommodate
every religious tradition.
298
299
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original position’s thought experiment is to identify political institutions that
would accommodate the broadest range of people -- but not everybody.
To this the following might be asked: why does the original position
try to identify political institutions that would be acceptable to the broadest
range of people?
Stated differently, why would people in the original
position select a large, heterogeneous polity, rather than small, homogeneous
polities? This is a difficult question because there likely are costs to
heterogeneous polities. For example, the need to accommodate diverse
cultural groups limits the degree to which governmental institutions can
support (or at least not undermine) each distinct cultural group. For
example, the size and diversity of the United States account for the fact that
the Religious Institution Principle only applies to matters that are indispensable
for American religious institutions.300
While there clearly are benefits to large diverse polities that require
no elaboration here, there is no reason to think that all people in an original
position would agree that one type of polity – small and homogeneous, or
large and diverse – would be preferred by every reasonable person. Rather,
some individuals, on account of their personal preferences and
comprehensive views, can be expected to prefer large, heterogenous polities,
and others to prefer small, homogeneous polities. This suggests that rather
than running the original position’s thought experiment on a country-bycountry basis – as Rawls does -- it ought to be performed on an international
basis. 301 Doing so leads to the following conclusion: people in the original
position would choose to create a diverse set of countries in the world from
which people could choose – both large heterogeneous and small
homogeneous polities. 302 It also might mean that large heterogeneous
polities like the United States, from which exit is particularly costly, should
allow for substantially empowered sub-federal (and probably sub-state)
polities within which people who prefer small homogeneous polities can be
substantially free to govern themselves. 303

This is true because not all commitments can be simultaneously realized. See generally GUIDO
CALABRESI & P HILLIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC C HOICES . For instance, well-orderedness can come into
conflict with the Religious Institution Principle, and the Religious Institution Principle can conflict with
individual liberties, as discussed above. See supra Part IV.B.3.
301 To be clear, this constitutes a reworking of Rawls’ framework, not a mere application of it. See
supra text accompanying notes 26-27 (justifying this). A full exposition of this idea, though beyond the
scope of this Article, is the subject of a work-in-progress. See Mark D. Rosen, Is a Non-Neutral Liberal
State an Oxymoron? (copy on file with author).
302 See id.
303 For a full defense of this position, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 26.
300
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We are now in a position to explain the adequacy of the Religious
Institution Principle. People in the original position would want to create
both large heterogeneous polities (like the United States) and small
homogeneous polities. This Article has focused on articulating the Religious
Institution Principle and fleshing out its (stage 2 and 3) implications in large
heterogeneous polities. People in the original position would agree to the
contents of the Religious Institution Principle described here, even though
some religions’ religious institutions would not be accommodated, for three
interlocking reasons: (1) only applications of the Religious Institution
Principle described here would be workable in a large, diverse polity; (2) size
and diversity offers benefits that may appeal to some religious people,
notwithstanding the limitations that diversity necessarily imposes on
realizations of the Religious Institution Principle; and (3) there also would be
options of small, homogeneous polities.
D.
Does the Religious Institution Principle Create Problematic
Asymmetries?
It might be objected that the Religious Institution Principle is
normatively undesirable because it creates two asymmetries. First, the
Religious Institution Principle may be thought to lead to an asymmetry
between religions and non-religious commitments insofar as it provides
special protections only for religious institutions (the “Religion/NonReligion Asymmetry Critique”). Second, the Religious Institution Principle
may be thought to lead to an asymmetry between religious institutions and
the state insofar as the principle imposes significant limits on what the state
can do to influence religious institutions, but does not constrain religious
institutions’ efforts to influence laws (the “State/Religion Asymmetry
Critique”).304
1.

The Religion/Non-Religion Asymmetry Critique

The “Religion/Non-Religion Asymmetry Critique” builds on an
extensive contemporary literature claiming that it is normatively problematic
to favor religion over non-religious commitments. 305 But even assuming that
religion is not meaningfully different from non-theological commitments for
purposes of politics,306 the Religion/Non-Religion Asymmetry Critique is
unfounded. The Religious Institution Principle is implied by the first
Cf. Micah Schartzman, What if Religion Isn’t Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012).
See, e.g., C HRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER AND LAWRENCE W. SAGER, R ELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION.
306 Many do not accept this assumption. For powerful arguments as to why religion appropriately is
treated differently in the United States, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 285, at 120-65.
304
305
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principle of justice on account of the role that religion plays in developing,
and facilitating actualization of, peoples’ conceptions of the good. But Rawls
makes no claim that religion alone does this. To the contrary, his explanation
of the original position (which refers to the need to “take the religious,
philosophical or moral convictions of persons seriously” 307) proves otherwise. For this
reason, the Religious Institution Principle does not imply that religious
institutions alone demand protection. Simply stated, the existence of the
Religious Institution Principle does not preclude what might be called a ‘nonReligious Institution Principle.’
One who claims the existence of a non-Religious Institution
Principle, however, properly bears two burdens. First, she must identify
what non-religious systems would be viewed by people behind the veil (or at
the second stage) as aiming to develop and facilitate the fully informed
exercise of the capacity to formulate a conception of the good, and hence
qualifying under the first principle of justice. Second, she must identify what
non-religious institutions would be seen by people behind the veil (or second
stage) as being necessary for the non-religious system to accomplish the
above aim.
In making the argument on behalf of the non-Religious Institution
Principle, it is not sufficient to say that “bowling leagues are really important
to some people,” or even that “bowling is what allows some people to fully
self-actualize in their view.” While both may be true, the question instead is
whether it plausibly can be maintained that people behind the veil of
ignorance, reasoning in an original position or at the second stage, would
identify bowling leagues as the sorts of institutions that would receive special
protection under the first principle of justice.
To be clear, this Article does not claim that the non-Religious
Institution Principle comprises a null set. That principle’s contents instead
turn on empirical considerations that are society-dependent. But, as
explained earlier, it is unquestionably true that the Religious Institution
Principle is not a null-set in contemporary America. If the non-Religious
Institution Principle happens to protect no institutions in a particular society,
this would not be a justifiable basis for condemning the fact that the
Religious Institution Principle does. Any such asymmetry merely would
reflect the fact that religions are different from non-religious systems in a
respect that matters for people reasoning from behind a veil of ignorance or
at the second stage in a particular society.

307

RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM , supra note 22, at 19 (emphasis supplied).
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The State/Religion Asymmetry Critique

Micah Schwartzman recently has done yeoman’s work articulating a
case for symmetry between the state and religion, inveighing against “claims
that religious convictions are not special for justifying political and legal
decisions, but that they are special for purposes of obtaining
accommodations.” 308 Schwartzman argues that such a position is internally
inconsistent, if not self-servingly hypocritical. He instead argues that that
either (1) religions are special, and hence they appropriately receive special
protections but also cannot aim to influence state laws, or that (2) religions are
not special, and hence can aim to influence state laws but are not entitled to
special protections either. I shall dub this the State/Religion Asymmetry
Critique.
It might be thought that the Religious Institution Principle is
problematic because it is susceptible to the State/Religion Asymmetry
Critique. But there are two reasons why the State/Religion Asymmetry
Critique does not undermine the Religious Institution Principle.
a.

Public Reason

First, the State/Religion Asymmetry Critique may not apply to the
Religious Institution Principle, as a matter of internal Rawlsian political
theory, because Rawls does impose constraints on how religions behave
toward the state through what he calls the “public reason” requirement.
Public reason refers to the constraints that are placed upon the types of
reasons that can be drawn upon, by those to whom public reason applies, in
setting a polity’s decisions concerning “fundamental political questions,”
which comprise “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.” 309
One requirement that is “expressed in” public reason is what Rawls calls the
“criterion of reciprocity.”310 The “criterion of reciprocity” is more expansive
in application than public reason insofar as the former applies not only to
fundamental political questions but also to “particular statutes and laws
enacted.” 311 Under the criterion of reciprocity, “[o]ur exercise of political
power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would
offer for our political actions – were we to state them as government officials

Schwartzman, supra note 304, at 1359 (emphasis in original).
RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 22, at 133.
310 See id. at 141 (stating that “[t]he limiting feature of these forms [of public reason] is the criterion of
reciprocity . . .”). For a full discussion of public reason’s complex requirements, see id. at 133-52.
311 See id.
308
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– are sufficient, and we also reasonably think other citizens could accept
those reasons.” 312
Public reason’s constraints plausibly could defeat the State/Religion
Asymmetry Critique. If so, it would have to be determined whether public
reason’s norms already are present and operative in the United States. For
example, the Establishment Clause’s neutrality requirement already may serve
this role.313 If not, adoption of the Religious Institution Principle in
American politics would have to be joined with adoption of public reason’s
requirements.
However, it ultimately is uncertain, for two reasons, whether public
reason successfully defuses the State/Religion Asymmetry Critique. First, it
is unclear precisely what symmetry requires, and hence whether public reason
satisfies it. Second, it is not clear how much constraint public reason
actually imposes. Many Rawlsians sharply criticized public reason for
limiting the extent to which religious persons could bring their convictions to
politics,314 and Rawls reworked public reason to include several caveats, most
importantly the proviso, 315 which collectively may mean (according to
esteemed Rawlsian Samuel Freeman) that “majority democratic decision by
itself is sufficient ‘public reason’ for restricting conduct.” 316 While this
probably is an overstatement, Freeman’s observation suggests public reason
may have only limited bite. If so, public reason might not satisfy a plausibly
defined symmetry. Though these are important questions, it is neither
possible 317 nor necessary (due to the next subsection) to finally settle public
reason’s scope in this Article.
b.

Why Symmetry Is Unnecessary

Though aesthetics and intuition frequently generate strong initial
expectations for symmetry, asymmetry is sometimes acceptable if not
See RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 22, at 137.
See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860-61 (2005) (Establishment Clause bars
laws with the “ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion;” the Clause “mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion”). For a
discussion of some of the complexities of contemporary establishment clause doctrine, see Mark D.
Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV . 669, 672-80 (2003).
314 See, e.g., PAUL J. W EITHMAN , RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (Cambridge 2006);
CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (Cambridge 2002); KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
315 See Martha Nussbaum, Rawls’s Political Liberalism: A Reassessment, 24 RATIO JURIS 1, 11-19 (2011)
(discussing the proviso and other modifications Rawls made in response to critics to the “duty of
civility” and “public reason”).
316 SAMUEL FREEMAN , RAWLS 80 (2007). I am indebted to Andy Koppelman for directing me to this.
317Public reason is a complex subject that has generated a cottage industry of high quality analysis. See,
e.g., supra note 314.
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preferable; consider what Picasso did to classical conceptions of symmetrypremised beauty. 318 In short, the need for symmetry cannot be assumed.
In fact, deeper reflection shows there is no reason to think that
State/Religion Asymmetry is illogical, reflects bad faith, or is otherwise
condemnable. From within an internal Rawlsian analysis, 319 this can be seen
by thinking back to first principles, and considering the incentives that are
faced by persons in the original position. Participants are not philosophers
striving toward maximal theoretical consistency, but ordinary (albeit
imagined) people, acting under a veil of ignorance, who are choosing the
fairest political system to which they will voluntarily submit themselves over
time. The first principle of justice reflects an understanding that participants
behind the veil can be expected to have a hierarchy of concerns, with the
result that they would be willing to allow political processes to decide some
matters but not others; falling into the latter category is the formation and
realization of the conception of the good of the persons they might
represent. It is this reasoning process that gives rise to limitations on the
state, including the Religious Institution Principle and the Non-Religious
Institution Principle.
Public reason’s constraints on religion and other comprehensive
views, however, are generated by an entirely different set of considerations.
There accordingly is no reason to expect that public reason’s limitations will
be “symmetrical” to the limitations imposed by the Religious and nonReligious Institution Principles. Rawls tells us that “[t]he idea of public
reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that
are to determine a constitutional democratic government’s relation to its
citizens and their relation to one another.” 320 In other words, public reason
helps determine the circumstances that justify government’s exercise of
coercive political authority over citizens.321 Public reason reflects the
understanding that that “[o]ur exercise of political power is proper only when
we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions
– were we to state them as government officials – are sufficient, and we also

For the classical view, see HERMANN W EYL, S YMMETRY. For a discussion of Picasso’s rejection of
then-prevailing symmetry norms, see JOHN RICHARDSON, A LIFE OF PICASSO: THE TRIUMPHANT
YEARS, 1917-32.
319 This part of my argument is designed to show that the Religious Institution Principle is not a
mistaken inference, but is consistent with the rest of Rawls’ framework. It does not on its own defeat
the asymmetry critique insofar as it presumes the appropriateness of the original position. It shows,
though, that any asymmetry critique must be spelled out, and cannot tautologically be assumed
problematic simply due to an absence of symmetry.
320 Rawls, supra note 179, at 132.
321 Id.(“ In short, [public reason] concerns how the political relation is to be understood.”)
318
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reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those
reasons.” 322
In short, since the considerations that give shape to public reason are
fundamentally different from those that give rise to the Religious Institution
Principle, there is no reason to expect symmetry in their scope. The
State/Religion Asymmetry Critique accordingly falls away.
CONCLUSION
The Religious Institution Principle’s derivation reveals why it is fair,
and why it plausibly can be thought to be acceptable to both religious and
non-religious citizens. The Religious Institution Principle has the conceptual
resources for determining (a) to what religions it does not apply, (b) what
qualifies as a religious institution, (c) to what laws it applies, and (d) why and
under what circumstances its protections are non-absolute. The Religious
Institution Principle instantiates the political architecture of overlapping
spheres, and gives rise to a robust framework for analyzing the claims of
religious institutions.

322

See id. at 137.

